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5.

INTRODUCTION

Innovations in digital computer programming are ubiquitous in the
United States today. In many cases such innovations require a substantial investment. At the same time, the fruits of that investment, which
are essentially knowledge, can be exploited by others at a relatively
small marginal cost once available. Consequently, investors are
concerned with legal protection of proprietary rights in the software
innovations they finance. This article examines one legal approach to
the protection of proprietary interests in software-the patent system.
Digital computer programs have been written for more than twenty
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years. For at least thirteen years the Patent Office has been examining
patent applications containing explicit references to programming innovations. The availability and effectiveness of patents on these programs has been vigorously debated in the secondary literature for more
than a decade. The question of patent availability has been litigated for
nine years and has been the subject of two Supreme Court decisions.
This article provides an overview of what has developed from that
lengthy experience. More particularly, the following discussion covers:
(a) In what sense, and under what circumstances, patent protection is available for digital computer programs;
(b) Whether, and under what conditions, such protection ought
to be available; and,
(c) Whether the questions in (b) should be resolved within the
patent adjudication system, viz., the Patent Office and the
courts, or by congressional action.
The discussion is intended to be comprehensible to the non-attorney. Therefore, because the doctrines and procedures of the patent law
are central to the issues addressed, this article is arranged to provide an
accumulative, conceptual foundation for the conclusions reached in the
last section. Section I is a capsule presentation of the elements of patent
law and practice relevant to the later material. In Section II, legal issues
specific to patents on programming innovations are introduced in a
topical discussion and then examined in the dynamic context of the
judicial process. The nonlegal, policy considerations arising in the debate are recounted in Section III. Section IV provides an evaluation and
analysis of the experience that inventors have had with the program
patent question. The article concludes in Section V with a summary of
the factors relevant to future consideration of the program patentability issue.
I.

A.

AN OVERVIEW OF PATENT LAW

Introduction

The United States patent system is based on federal statutes and
administered exclusively by federal institutions. The Patent Act of
1952,1 the latest in a series of reenactments since 1790, was enacted by
Congress pursuant to Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution.2 That the Constitution places limits on congressional authority in
patent matters was recently made clear in Graham v. John Deere Co. :3
1. 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The sections of the Patent Code
cited in this article are reprinted in the Appendix in this issue.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8:
The Congress shall have Power ... To promote Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries; ...
3. 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459 (1966).
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The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation. This qualified authority.
is limited to the promotion of advances in the
"useful arts." * * * The Congress in the exercise of the patent
power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated
constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly
without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit
gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available. Innovation advancement, and things
which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites
in a patent system which by constitutional command must "promote the Progress of. . . useful Arts."4
The Patent Code is the foundation of the patent system, but statutory language is an inadequate guide to the "law" of patents, most of
which has developed through the judicial and administrative institutions responsible for applying the statutes. At present, the law is
comprised of the relevant statutes, interpretations of those statutes and
their predecessors by the federal courts, and the regulations and practices of the Patent Office.
B.

Requirements for Patentability
1.

Substantive Requirements

The Patent Code specifies several qualities required of an invention
before it is eligible for patent protection. These substantive requirements may be classified under the following labels: patentable subject
matter, 5 novelty,6 utility,7 originality8 and nonobviousness 9 An invention which satisfies these requirements is said to be patentable.
Patentable Subject Matter. Section 101 of the Patent Code
provides that: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to
the conditions and requirements of this title."' 0 "Process," "machine,"
"manufacture," "composition of matter" and "new and useful improvements" constitute the categories of patentable subject matter. The
statutory content of "process" is amplified in section 100(b)."1 The term
4. Id. at 5-6, 148 U.S.P.Q. at 462.
5. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
6. Id. § 102 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
7. Id. § 101 (1970).
8. Id. § 102(f) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
9. Id. § 103 (1970).
10. Id. § 101 (1970).
11. The term "process" means process, art or method, and includes a new use of
a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material. Id. §
100(b) (1970).
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"apparatus" is used interchangeably with "machine" in the patent
12
law.
These categorical labels are legal "words of art"; that is, their
meaning can only be understood by reference to the court decisions
which have added or subtracted phenomena from these categories over
the history of patent adjudication. In the course of this development,
the courts have enunciated various rules for including or excluding
phenomena. One such rule, which will receive extensive consideration
in the following section, is that "mental processes" are not patentable
subject matter (or, as it is alternatively expressed, are "nonstatutory
subject matter"). 1 3 Another is that a patentable "process" must "act
upon or change materials to a different state or thing."14 In sum, the
content of the subject matter categories cannot be viewed as coextensive with the phenomena denoted by the definition of the terms in
everyday use or even in the specialized usage of technical communities.
Novelty. The requirements of "novelty" are spelled out in
section 102.15 An innovation which has been previously "known or
used" is said to have been "anticipated" by the prior invention. 6
"Known," "used," and "prior invention" are all words of art and have
meanings peculiar to patent law.
Nonobviousness. Section 103 states the only standards of inventive quality in the code. 7 There is an elaborate doctrinal structure
that shapes the content of "prior art," "obvious," and "ordinary skill."
Nevertheless, the application of section 103 is ultimately a subjective
decision based on the overall impressions of a judge. 18
Utility and Originality. "Utility"-the quality of being use12. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1395 n.11, 162 U.S.P.Q. 541,543 n.l, 2 CLSR 32,
34 n.11 (C.C.P.A. 1969), superseding, 415 F.2d 1378, 159 U.S.P.Q. 583, 2,CLSR 8
(C.C.P.A. 1968).
13. See notes 110-39 infra and accompanying text.
14. See note 160 infra.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) states in pertinent part:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country ...
before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent ....
16. Schroeder v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 514 F.2d 901, 903, 185
U.S.P.Q. 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1975).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970):
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains ....
18. C-Thru Products, Inc. v. Uniflex, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 213, 219, 152 U.S.P.Q.
303, 308 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
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ful-and "originality"-the requirement that the patent applicant be
himself the inventor of the claimed invention-have not been of importance in the program patent context.
2.

ProceduralRequirements

Section 111 lists among the required components of the patent
application a specification.1 9 The term "specification" is then defined
and described in section 112.20 The basic description, or "disclosure," of
the applicant's invention is set forth in the first part of the specification
in accordance with the requirements of the first paragraph of section
112.21

Section 112 further requires that " [t]he specification shall conclude
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claim-22
ing the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
The claims are of critical importance, since they define the scope of the
patent when infringement is at issue. 23 Phenomena capable of infringing the patent are said to be "covered" by the claims. Assuming that the
claims are properly drafted, they cover the invention disclosed in the
specification. When a particular phenomenon is legally determined to
be described by the language of a claim, the claim is said to "read on"
whether or not the applicant intends that the claim
that phenomenon,
"cover" it.24 Parts of the invention can be mentioned, or "recited," in
the claims themselves, in which case they act as "limitations" and
19. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
20. Id. § 112 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
21. The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which
it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention.

Id.
22. Id.
23. Maclaren v. B-I-W Group, Inc., 535 F.2d 1367, 1372, 190 U.S.P.Q. 513, 517 (2d
Cir. 1976).
24. The use of the terms "cover" and "read on" can be illustrated by the following example: Imagine that a person invents a new type of aircraft which satisfies
the substantive requirements for patentability. Suppose further that he fully discloses the invention according to the requirements of the first paragraph of section
112 and then offers as his only claim "a heavier-than-air flying machine." The claim
"reads on" a large number of "old" aircraft, over which the applicant is not entitled
coverage since they "anticipate" his invention. Therefore, the claim will be rejected
for failing to "point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention" (35 U.S.C. § 112 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)), although the claim
does properly "cover" the invention which he has disclosed.
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confine the set of phenomena upon which the claims are readable.
Finally, the third paragraph of section 112 provides for the
"means-plus-function" form for machine claims. 28 All of the machine
claims in the cases considered in this article have been so claimed.

C. Scope of PatentProtection
A patent grants "the right to exclude others from making, using or
selling the invention throughout the United States" for a period of
seventeen years commencing with the date of issue. 27 That right is often
characterized as a "monopoly." 28 However, it is a very limited monopoly inasmuch as it makes no explicit provision for the patentee's right to
make, use, or sell his invention, but gives the patentee only the right to
exclude others from the use of his invention. 29 In fact, the ability of a
patentee to exploit his "monopoly" is heavily hedged by legal
constraints, particularly those imposed by the antitrust laws.3 °
At a trial of alleged infringement, the court will construe the patentee's claims narrowly in light of his disclosed invention, and then
inquire whether the alleged infringing phenomenon is covered by the
claims. 31 Various doctrines have been announced as guides in this procedure. One is the "doctrine of equivalents," whereby an apparatus
claim will be held infringed if the defendant's device "performs substantially the same functions in substantially the same way."3 2 It can
readily be seen, however, that infringement proceedings are ultimately
governed by the same types of subjective judgment that determines the
outcome of nonobviousness issues under section 103.
D.

33

PatentProcedure

A person seeking patent coverage for an invention first drafts an
25. 4 A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 241 (2d ed. 1965).
26. An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means
or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure,
material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to
cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
28. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229, 140 U.S.P.Q. 524, 527
(1964).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 230, 140 U.S.P.Q. at 527. See C. HILLS, ANTITRUST ADVISOR §§ 7.1 et seq.
(1971 & Supp. 1974); ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 327-53 (1975).
31. 4 A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 225 (2d ed. 1965).
32. Barrett v. United States, 405 F.2d 502,509,156 U.S.P.Q. 565,570 (Ct. Cl. 1968),
citing, Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877); Autogiro Co. v. United
States, 384 F.2d 391, 401, 155 U.S.P.Q. 697, 705 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
33. For a more rigorous discussion of the procedures applicable to the prosecution of a patent application in the Patent and Trademark Office, see generally, I.
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application and files it with the Patent Office. The drafting of the
specification involves substantial strategy, since the applicant's interest lies in maximizing the breadth of his claims while minimizing
disclosure of his invention. It is typical for a specification to contain a
series of progressively broader claims. In program-related cases, both
apparatus and process claims are frequently drawn to the same invention.34
When the Patent Office receives an application, it is assigned to an
examiner who reviews it for conformity to the substantive and procedural requirements of the law. Part of that reviewing process includes
a search of the Patent Office files for prior art relevant to section 103
requirements. Frequently, the examiner has objections to an application, in which case he rejects it and returns it to the applicant for
alternation and resubmission. The process continues until the examiner
either approves the application or enters a final rejection. If the application is approved, the patent issues and the application is thereafter
open to public inspection. A final rejection may be appealed to the
Patent Office Board of Appeals.
If the applicant is not satisfied with the decision of the board, he
can appeal to either the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals or the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 35 Either the
Patent Office or the applicant can petition the United States Supreme
Court for review of an adverse decision in the C.C.P.A.; however, at this
level, for the first time in the appellate process, the appellant does not
36
have an absolute right to a hearing.
Once a patent has issued, the patentee can sue for infringement in
any United States district court and have the ordinary appeal to the
courts of appeals. 37 Again, the final appeal available is by petition for
38
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
II.

THE LEGAL ISSUES

A.

Introduction

The first significant judicial consideration of program-related inventions occurred in the 1968 case of In re Praterand Wei.3 9 It was
KAYTON, PATENT PREPARATION AND PROSECUTION PRACTICE (1977); 5 A. DELLER,
DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 423-67 (2d ed. 1972).

34. See, e.g., In re Brandstadter, 484 F.2d 1395, 179 U.S.P.Q. 286, 4 CLSR 976
(C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Ghiron, 442 F.2d 985, 169 U.S.P.Q. 723, 3 CLSR 70 (C.C.P.A.
1971).
35. 35 U.S.C. 33 141, 145 (1970). All appeals in program-related cases, however,
have been to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals [hereinafter cited as
"C.C.P.A."].
36. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 2101 (1970).
37. Id. § 1338(a) (1970).
38. Id. §§ 1254, 2101 (1970).
39. 415 F.2d 1378, 159 U.S.P.Q. 583,2 CLSR 8 (C.C.P.A. 1968), superseded by, 415
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preceded by a lengthy public debate in which a variety of patent law
40
issues associated with computer programs were raised and argued.
That debate, already vigorous by 1968, was stimulated rather than
resolved by the Pratercase and only began to wane following the last
round of commentary on the Supreme Court's decision in Gottschalk v.
41

Benson.

This section considers the law of program patents. It begins with a
topical introduction to the issues appearing in the debate, followed by a
chronological discussion of the case law, which provides a dynamic
perspective of patent law development. Finally, the legal issues are
reexamined in light of this case law. Inasmuch as this discussion must
necessarily neglect many issues, it does not constitute a definitive guide
to the law of program-related patents. A full appreciation of this law
requires a careful reading of the decided cases in light of the history and
development of patent law as a whole. However, the following essential
points should emerge from the discussion that follows:
(1) the contours of the major legal issues raised by attempts to
gain patent protection for program innovations;
(2) the reasons why a question such as "Are programs patentable?" may not be answerable;
(3) an indication of the type of argument entailed by a judicial
resolution of the program patent question; and,
(4) some understanding of the relevant dynamics of judicial
behavior.
B.

Patents on Programs Per Se

The patentability question began as an inquiry into whether patents could be obtained for computer programs claimed as such. In 1966,
the Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System recommended that patents not be granted for "programs."4 2 Another view
was that machine processes or configurations were preferable subjects
for claims and that claims directed to "programs" were both unnecessary and undesirable. 43
F.2d 1393, 162 U.S.P.Q. 541, 2 CLSR 32 (C.C.P.A. 1969). These two cases will
hereinafter be referenced as PraterI and PraterII, respectively, and collectively
as Prater.
40. The bulk of this public debate is contained in articles which appeared in a
myriad of computer and legal publications. A listing of these articles appears in the
Bibliography in this issue.
41. 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 67, 3 CLSR 256 (1972) [hereinafter sometimes cited
as Benson]. The United States Supreme Court decision in Dann v. Johnston, 425
U.S. 219, 189 U.S.P.Q. 257, 5 CLSR 1133 (1976), and its denial of certiorari in Dann v.
Chatfield, - U.S. -, 195 U.S.P.Q. 465 (1977) and Dann v. Noll, - U.S. -, 195
U.S.P.Q. 465 (1977), will certainly spark a new round of articles.
42. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM 13 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT].

43. Those who seek protection of inventions embodied in computer programs
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Partly because litigated claims have all been drafted to machine
processes or configurations, the issues raised by claims to programs per
se remain obscure. They are nonetheless of continuing interest, since
patent coverage of program inventions may yet be broadly granted or
withheld on such terms.
1.

DefinitionalProblems

Use of the term "program" involves several types of definitional
ambiguities. A "program" can denote a spectrum of phenomena ranging from the formulation of problem-solving techniques to hardware44
related implementations.
One source of confusion lies in the distinction between the abstract
and concrete conceptions of computer programs. In the abstract approach, each metamorphosis is characterized as a set of abstract rules,
and the definition therefore inherently emphasizes the goals and problem-solving methods of the programmer. The concrete approach, by
contrast, focuses on the physical media characteristic of each metamorphosis, such as writings of equations, flowcharts, coding forms, punch45
ed cards, magnetic tapes, and the programmed computer itself.
A further source of confusion is exemplified by a program
contained in a deck of punched cards, which has been described as both
"records of signal combinations" and "the means by which those signal
combinations are introduced into the computer memory." 4 The first
perspective stresses the physical pattern of the alterations in the
recording medium unique to the particular program; the second refers
as much to the medium itself as to its unique configuration.
These definitional ambiguities are further illustrated in the welter
do so generally not by claiming "a series of instructions," but by claiming the novel
machine system, process, or control mechanism obtained by such a program.
Jacobs, Commission's Report (re: ComputerPrograms),49 J. PAT. OFF.Soc'Y 372,
373 (1967). See also, Scherback, Computer Programs:UnpatentableOffspring of a
Sacred Cow?, 5 PAT. L. ANN. 195 (1967).
44. The set of abstract rules to be given a computer to solve a particular
problem can pass through four distinct metamorphoses. Each stage can be referred to as a "program"; in addition, this term can encompass the entire set of
metamorphoses. The metamorphoses contemplated in this definition include the
"algorithm," the "source program," and the "object program." Puckett, The Limits
of Copyright and Patent Protectionfor Computer Programs,16 ASCAP CoPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 81, 138-39 (1968).
45. Illustrative of the concrete approach is one writer's characterization of a
program listing as a "functional diagram of a logic machine." Nimtz, The Data
Processing Revolution, in PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, SOFTWARE PROTECTION BY
TRADE SECRET, CONTRACT, PATENT 125, 127 (1969) [hereinafter cited as PATENT
RESOURCES GROUP].

46. Jacobs, Patent, Copyright, and Trade Secrets Aspects of Computers, in
ABA, COMPUTERS AND THE LAW: AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK 90, 91 (R.
Bigelow ed.
1966).
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of divergent definitions of "algorithm" and "program" appearing in the
program patentability debate. An "algorithm" has been characterized
variously as:
(1)

".

.

a precise or mathematical
. conclusions based upon 47

premise and line of reasoning.
(2)

".

.

. a statement of a conclusion based on a sequence of

logical, mental, or natural
steps involving mathematical,
48
rules or principles."
(3)

".

.

. a method, recipe, or set of rules that can be used for

with the aid of a general purpose digital
solving a problem
49
(4)

computer."
for
". . . a prescribed set of well-defined rules or processes
' 50

(5)

".

the solution of problems in a finite number of steps.
.

. any self-consistent set of ordered steps specifying de-

finable operations upon data and leading to a particular
result." 51
Definitions of "program" have varied from the anthropomorphic to
the mechanistic. Among the former are those which seem to suggest
that computers are sentient beings:
(1)

".

.

. a set of instructions for communicating the mental

concept."52
(3)

". . . a detailed set of instructions telling the computer what
' 53
to do."
". . . a set of instructions to a computer as to how it should

(4)

the "packaging" of an "idea.

(2)

54
manipulate information and data."
' 55

Still stressing the abstract qualities of programs, but without anthropomorphic overtones, are such definitions as:
or condition the
(1) ". . . a series of instructions which control
56
operation of a data processing machine."
47.

UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE, PROPOSED GUIDELINES TO EXAMINATION OF

PROGRAMS, 829 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 865 (Aug. 16, 1966) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED GUIDELINES],reprinted in the Appendix in this issue.
48. Comment, Process Patentsfor Computer Programs,56 CALIF. L. REV. 466,

483 (1968).
49. Brief for International Business Machines Corp. (IBM), as Amicus Curiae at
3, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972).
50. Brief for Honeywell, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 3, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972), quoting AMERICAN NAT'L STANDARDS,
INC., No. ANSI X3.12-1970, AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD VOCABULARY OF INFORMATION PROCESSING 12 (1970).
51. Nimtz, The Supporting Disclosure, 5 PAT. L. ANN. 191, 192 (1967).
52. Brief for Honeywell, Inc., supra note 50, at 7.
53. Note, ComputerProgramsand ProposedRevisions of the Patentand Copyright Laws, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1541, 1541 (1968).
54. Brief for Business Equip. Mfrs.' Ass'n (B.E.M.A.), as Amicus Curiae at 6,
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972).
55. Brief for IBM, supra note 49, at 23.

56.

REPORT,

supra note 42, at 12.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1

". . . a set of steps that serve to specify changes in the state
of the component parts of a digital computer."57
Finally, programs have been characterized as digital computer machine
states and processes:
(1) ". . . the coded sequence of instructions recorded in binary
' 58
notation in the magnetic cores of the computer memory.
59
(2) ". . . a series of operations performed by a computer."
The absence of definitional uniformity has been viewed with
concern by many patent proponents. Some commentators have
criticized the "indiscriminate" use of the term "program" and have
called for new terms to replace those contaminated by nonrigorous
connotations.60 It has also been said that "[t]he myth that a computer
program is a non-machine device may stem in part from the intellectual
process of and the techniques used by computer programmers," 61 and
that "human beings tend to project the properties of the thing sym' 62
bolized into the symbol itself.
(2)

Difficulties in securing program patents were considered by a
panel at the 1965 Conference of the International Federation of Information Processing. "The most important single development of the
panel and the discussion that followed was the clear delineation of the
need to define further the concepts of 'software' and 'program' "63 The
opinion of the panel was that a definition of the term "program" by the
64
software industry was preferable to a judicial definition.
It is certainly reasonable to suppose that a clear definition of a
"program" would be a prerequisite to a patent on a program claimed as
such. However, expectations that the problem can be solved by definitional exercises within the software industry reflect serious misconceptions of the patent law process. 5
2.

Legal Problems

When a program is viewed from an abstract perspective, it is dif57. Comment, Computer ProgramsAre Patentable,1 SETON HALL L. REV. 113,
113 (1970).
58. Nimtz, Computers,Programsand the Patent Laws, 11 IDEA 199, 206 (1967).
59. Jacobs, PatentProtectionof ComputerPrograms,47 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 6, 7
(1965), reprintedfrom 7 CoM. ACM 583, 583 (1964).
60. See, e.g., Jacobs, PatentableMachines- Systems Embodiable in Hardware
or Software (The Myth of the Non-Machine), in COMPUTERS-IN-LAW INSTITUTE, THE
LAW OF SOFTWARE 1968 PROCEEDINGS, at B-77, B-85 (I. Kayton ed. 1968) [hereinafter
cited as THE LAW OF SOFTWARE].

61. Id. at B-84.
62. Nimtz, supra note 45, at 126.
63. Boonin, Patents and Copyrights-WhatShould be Protected.?,8 COM. ACM
474, 474 (1965).
64. Id.
65. See notes 5-38 supra and accompanying text.
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ficult, if not impossible, to separate the "set of abstract rules" or "set of
instructions" from the underlying algorithm. Therefore, patent claims
drawn to cover programs defined as such would have to overcome a
series of judicial doctrines tending to block patents on "ideas" and
closely related phenomena. It was stated in LeRoy v. Tatham6 6 that a
"principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a
motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them
'
an exclusive right."67
In Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corpo68
ration of America, the Supreme Court said that "a scientific truth, or
the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention. ' 69 Is an
algorithm a "fundamental truth" or "the mathematical expression of
it"? Several of the definitions quoted above speak of algorithms as
"principles" or "rules."7 Although algorithms are probably more usefully seen as normative rather than as descriptive, it seems inconceivable that a claim to the process of squaring 'c', multiplying the square
by 'm" and assigning the product to 'e' would pass the Mackay test if e
= mc-a description of a natural relationship-would not.
Inasmuch as patents are only issued for useful innovations, a reasonable reading of patent law doctrines cannot support the contention
that they apply only to descriptions of principles and not to their
applications. What has not been made clear is whether an algorithm of
the type embodied, for example, in a programmed sort routine, would
fall under the ban of cases such as LeRoy and Mackay. Such algorithms
are at least of a different order of generality from that of e = mc 2 and
are heavily conditioned by the manmade devices upon which they are
implemented. However, the intellectual process of perceiving and exploiting physical relationships is very similar in both instances.
The alternative to claiming a "program" abstractly conceived as "a
set of instructions" is to claim a physical device which has been configured in a particular way. A digital computer embodying a program
may be seen as a uniquely configured device, but it is unlikely that it
would ever be referred to as a "program" per se. 7"
A more familiar use of "program" in this connection is in reference
to printed program listings or coded input media. Claims drawn to
"programs" thus conceived, however, would have to surmount a series
of doctrinal hurdles associated with the media of recordation, whether
or not the word "program" appeared in the patent application.
66. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1852).
67. Id. at 175, quoted in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673,
675, 3 CLSR 256, 259 (1972).
68. 306 U.S. 86, 40 U.S.P.Q. 199 (1939).
69. Id. at 94, 40 U.S.P.Q. at 202, quoted in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67,
175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 675, 3 CLSR 256, 259 (1972).
70. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
71. Claims covering the configuration or operations of a programmed computer have avoided mention of "programs." See note 43 supra.
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At the coding stage of program development, a patent applicant
would encounter the "printed matter" doctrine, which says that a patentable invention cannot result from the mere reduction of an idea to
written or printed form.72 It has been suggested that the "printed matter" cases all turn on a user's contemplation of the writing while practicing the invention, and the mere fact that a person could interpret
whatever markings appear does not automatically invoke the doctrine.13 Whether a coding form is intended for "contemplation" by a
keypunch operator cannot be predetermined, since the term "contemplation" would receive a legal definition if an appropriate case arose.
But optical character recognition technology may obviate further human observation of these writings.
An uninterpreted card deck74 has the same characteristics as a
coding form prepared for optical scanning: it is readable but usually
unread by human beings. The patentability of card decks may receive
some support from Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pope,75 where a patent
was upheld on a transfer ticket with a novel detachable coupon. The
court stressed that the claims were limited to the structure of the
ticket. 76 However, it is unclear whether each novel pattern of holes
punched in a succession of cards would be seen as a different "structure."
A configured, magnetic recordation device, such as a tape or disc,
may also be referred to as a "program." Magnetic embodiments seem to
be outside the scope of the "printed matter" doctrine entirely, since
they are not directly readable by humans. However, it may be even
more difficult to distinguish different "structures" in these media than
in the case of punched cards, since the magnetically encoded information is invisible to the human eye.
There are other forms of pre-input, program embodiments, but
those mentioned above reveal the essential legal uncertainties peculiar
to this type of claim. Even were patents on such devices available, their
usefulness to the patentee would be questionable. Some commentators
have wondered whether patents on listings, for example, would protect
72. Comment, supra note 48, at 474. One commentator doubts that the "printed
matter" doctrine is a serious obstacle to program patents. See Jacobs, supra note
59, at 13, citing his earlier article, Comment, The Patentabilityof PrintedMatter:
Critique and Proposal, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 475 (1950). The history of program
patent litigation, however, suggests caution in dismissing the potential applicability of such doctrines to computer programs.
73. Kayton, PatentProtectabilityof Software: Background and CurrentLaw,
in THE LAW OF SOFTWARE, supra note 60, at B-25, B-38, reprintedin 9 JURIMETRICS J.
127, 135 (1969).
74. The term "uninterpreted card deck" refers to a deck of punched cards upon
which there appears no alphanumeric printing of the data punched in the cards.
75. 210 F. 443 (6th Cir. 1913).
76. Id. at 446.
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more than the descriptions contained therein 77 or amount to any more
than copyright protection.7 8 The significance of patents on these devices
would also depend on whether alternative embodiments would be considered "equivalents" in infringement litigation. 79 There is reason to
believe that the class of such equivalents would be narrowly defined by
the courts.80
C. Patents on Program-RelatedInventions
The law of patents on computer programs has developed exclusively in the context of applications claiming not programs as such, but
rather processes or machines embodying program inventions. An example of this approach is Claim No. 9 in the Prater and Wei application.8 '
The only point of novelty of this claim is in the algorithm, and the only
economical mode of practice is by digital computer.82 Yet, the claim
makes no mention of a "program."83
One reason for an indirect approach to program protection has
been the long-standing hostility of the Patent Office to patents on
"programs."8 4 Another related motive for focusing on the computer
77. Nimtz, supra note 58, at 205.
78. Kayton, supra note 73, at B-41, reprintedin 9 JURIMETRICS J. at 137.
79. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
80. See,e.g., Bullard Co. v. General Elec. Co., 348 F.2d 985, 146 U.S.P.Q. 141, 4
CLSR 1016 (4th Cir. 1965) (punched tape held not "equivalent" to an arrangement
of mechanical cams performing the same function).
81. 9. In mass spectrographic analysis where, from a given sample of material there is generated a spectrum function having peaks therein spaced
along a mass scale with respect to which the relationship between concentration, contribution factor of each of the m constituents of the mixture and
the magnitude of each of the n peaks in said spectrum is represented by a
set of m linear algebraic equations and where n is an integer greater than
m, the method of selecting for analysis a set of m peaks least susceptible to
error in concentration determination which comprises
di]viding each said contributing factor for each peak by a normalizing
function,
successively generating a determinant function for each said set of
peaks,
successively generating output indications of the magnitudes of said
determinant functions, and
selecting therefrom the determinant function of greatest magnitude for
identification of said peaks least susceptible to error.
PraterII, 415 F.2d at 1397, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 544-45, 2 CLSR at 37-38 (emphasis
omitted).
82. The applicants specified that their preferred mode of practice was by
analog computer and only mentioned digital computer practice as an alternative.
Id. That choice was questionable in 1961, when the application was filed. Today,
the manipulation of large systems of equations by analog computations is almost
unimaginable.
83. Id. at 1397 n.18, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 544 n.18, 2 CLSR at 37 n.18. Inventions so
claimed will be referred to hereinafter as "program-related inventions" to distinguish them from claims explicitly directed to programs per se.
84. See note 539 and text accompanying note 541 infra.
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itself has been to avoid the unfavorable doctrines discussed in the
preceding section, by placing a greater conceptual distance between the
inventions as claimed and the thought processes associated with them.
The history of such claims in the courts since 1968 reveals that this
approach has been only partially successful in avoiding doctrinal obstacles, and not at all successful in avoiding Patent Office opposition.8 5
For the sake of clarity, the following discussion of the legal issues
raised by indirect claims to program innovations is organized according
to the four major requirements for patentability defined by the Patent
Code: patentable subject matter (sections 100(b) and 101), non-anticipation (section 102), nonobviousness (section 103), and adequate claiming and disclosure (section 112).86 Other patent issues, such as the scope
of claims in an infringement context, have been discussed in the secondary literature and are mentioned below, although they have not yet
received judicial treatment in a program context. 87
1.

PatentableSubject Matter: Sections 100(b) and 101

The pertinent categories of subject matter are "processes" and
"machines", as listed in section 101 and amplified by section 100(b)'s
"new use of a known machine" subcategory of "process." As the general
patent law discussion above indicated, "process" and "machine" are
legal words of art, with ambiguous and constantly shifting boundaries.8 8 Some of the phenomena beyond the pale of patent protectionfor example, "phenomena of nature" 89-have been excluded on the
basis of intrinsic qualities attributed to them by the courts. Despite
repeated assertions by the C.C.P.A. to the contrary, however, the "subject matter" test also includes criteria vindicating other judicial
policies.
The courts, and notably the Supreme Court, feel obliged to examine
the relationship between the claimed application and the constitutional
charge that patents promote, rather than merely be within, the "useful
arts."90 "Nonstatutory subject matter" can therefore be understood in
some cases as meaning "too much." This was notably true in the Supreme Court decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, 91 where the claimed
process was clearly a machine process and at least Claim 8 could not be
read on any other mode of practice. 92
85. See notes 258-397 infra and accompanying text.
86. These sections of the Patent Code are reprinted in the Appendix in this
issue, and discussed at notes 5-18 supra and accompanying text.
87. But see note 403 infra.
88. See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
89. "Phenomena of nature" is obviously another word of art; in one sense
nothing which anyone would want to patent is anything else.
90. See note 2 supra.See also text accompanying note 4 supra.
91. 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972).
92. See note 326 infra.
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a.

"Process" Claims

An early article in the program patent debate provided the following sample format for claiming program inventions as "processes"
without explicit reference to a "program":
The method of summing signals which comprises the steps of
extracting a first set of signals from a memory and storing the
signals thus extracted in a register, adding a second set of signals
to the signals previously stored in said
register, and entering the
93
resultant signals into said memory.
Most of the earlier cases involved process claims, and there was a
substantial body of opinion that the apparatus claim format was inferior. Process claims were said to provide easier disclosure and broader coverage.9 4 One observer even speculated that apparatus claims
might not be available.9 5 Process claims were routinely upheld in the
C.C.P.A. over Patent Office subject matter objections until two claims
covering processes were rejected by the Supreme Court in Benson.96 In
a somewhat murky opinion, the C.C.P.A. relied on the authority of
Benson in rejecting the next process claims presented for its review.97
None have been litigated in the Supreme Court since Benson.
The legal doctrines debated in the context of the process approach
are nevertheless of continuing interest for the following reasons: (1) it is
not clear that Benson will support a blanket rejection of future process
claims to program-related inventions, at least in the C.C.P.A.; (2) the
Patent Office has asserted theories developed in this context as objections to program-related inventions claimed as apparatus; and (3) the
debate constitutes a revealing example of patent law argumentation.
At least three different perspectives on the "process" associated
with programs are available. One approach characterizes programming
as the method of constructing a "special purpose" machine.9 8 Another
93. Hamlin, ComputerProgramsAre Patentable,7 CoM. ACM 581,581 (1964). If
this example looks familar to readers of the Benson and Tabbott claims, it is
because Mr. Hamlin was Patent Attorney Director of Bell Telephone Laboratories,
Inc., the real party in interest in the Benson case. See also, Comment, supra note
57, at 131.
94. Nimtz, Computer Application and Claim Drafting Under CurrentLaw, in
PATENT REsOURCEs GROUP, supra note 45, at 242, 246. The assertion that broader
coverage is available from process claims is disputed in Note, Gottschalk v. Benson-The Supreme Court Takes A Hard Line on Software, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
635, 653 (1973).
95. See Comment, supra note 48, at 480. Numerous apparatus claims have since
been upheld by the C.C.P.A., however. See, e.g., In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 163
U.S.P.Q. 611, 2 CLSR 359 (C.C.P.A. 1969), discussed in notes 290-99 infra and
accompanying text.
96. 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972).
97. In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392,178 U.S.P.Q. 35,4 CLSR 66 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
98. Hamlin, supra note 93, at 582. See also text accompanying notes 71 supra &
181-86 infra.
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approach is to claim a process taking place solely within an already
programmed computer. Finally, either or both of these approaches can
be combined in a claim also reading on additional process steps, such as
industrial activity.
None of the litigated claims reads on the process of programming a
computer alone. 9 Six of the claims in the reported cases read on strictly
internal computer operations and were upheld by the C.C.P.A. 01° However, this was the type of claim rejected by the Supreme Court in
Benson.10' Seven other claims in the cases read on computer processes
combined with non-computer processes. One of these claimed the programming of a computer in conjunction with an external process (it was
rejected for reasons unrelated to section 101).102 The remainder claimed
among the process steps the operation of a computer; and of these, two
were upheld, 103 two were rejected for non-section 101 reasons,10 4 and
two fell under the cloud of Benson and were rejected as nonstatutory
subject matter.0 5
A special form of process claim is permitted by section 100(b)-the
"new use of a known machine." If the computer were the "machine," its
role would plainly have to be joined with noncomputer steps to fit the
literal wording of section 100(b). 10 6 One could imagine a claim for the
99. The United States Supreme Court in Benson so characterized the claims
before it, but the claims plainly read on the operation of a computer. See, e.g.,
Claim Nos. 8 & 13, 409 U.S. 63, 73-74, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 677, 3 CLSR 256, 263-64
(1972), reprinted in note 326 infra.
100. Claim No. 19, In re Mahony, 421 F.2d'742, 744,164 U.S.P.Q. 572,574, 2 CLSR
587, 589 (C.C.P.A. 1970); Claim Nos. 8 & 13, In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 683-84, 169
U.S.P.Q. 548, 549, 2 CLSR 1030, 1032-33 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Gottschalk
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972); Claim Nos. 1 & 7, lit re
McIlroy, 442 F.2d 1397, 1398, 170 U.S.P.Q. 31, 31, 3 CLSR 81, 82 (C.C.P.A. 1971); and
Claim No. 1, In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1000, 173 U.S.P.Q. 430,432,3 CLSR 173,
176 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
101. 409 U.S. 63, 73, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 677, 3 CLSR 256, 263 (1972).
102. Claim No. 13, In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1397, 163 U.S.P.Q. 611,613-14, 2
CLSR 359, 361-62 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
103. Claim Nos. 2 & 60, In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882,885,167 U.S.P.Q. 280,283, 2
CLSR 920, 924-25 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
104. Claim Nos. 9 & 17, PraterII,415 F.2d at 1397, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 544-45, 2 CLSR
at 37-38.
105. Claim Nos. 4 & 5, In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392, 1392-93, 178 U.S.P.Q. 35,
36, 4 CLSR 66, 67 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
106. Such a claim (Claim No. 19) was upheld in In re Foster, 438 F.2d 1011, 101314, 169 U.S.P.Q. 99, 100, 2 CLSR 994, 996-97 (C.C.P.A. 1971). Claim No. 19 states:
In the processing of geophysical data to compensate for the effect of
distortion present in obtaining said geophysical data and to emphasize the
characteristics of the geological formations producing said geophysical
data, the new use of computing apparatus, said computing apparatus being
interconnected to include:
a correlator,

1978]

LEGAL PROTECTION

"new use" of an input medium; that is, the programming of a digital
computer to achieve a defined computer state, although the medium
to the "printed matter" doctrine and hence not a
might be vulnerable
"machine."'0 7 Commentators have been ambivalent about claims cast
as "new uses." One concern has been the ability vel non of such a claim
to meet the test of being "non-analogous" to prior uses. 10 In Fosterand
other cases, the C.C.P.A. has upheld "new use" claims, 0 9 but it is not
clear that this claim format offers any special advantages if subject
matter. challenges arise.
Program-related processes, however claimed, have been attacked
as nonstatutory on the basis of theories that can be classified under the
headings of the "mental steps" doctrine, the "function of a machine"
doctrine, end use problems and the "preemption" doctrine. Each of
these doctrines will be analyzed in turn.
(1)

"Mental Steps" Doctrine

The "mental steps" doctrine, which had a rather inauspicious beginning under that label in Halliburton Oil Well Cement Co. v. Walker, 110 experienced a series of novel elaborations in the hands of the
Patent Office as the foundation of its attack on program-related process
a smoothing filter for smoothing the spectrum of the signal applied to
the input,
an inverter producing as an output coefficients of a filter which is the
inverse of the signal applied to the input, and
an inverse filter,
said new use comprising:
applying said geophysical data to said correlator to produce as an
output a signal having a distortion component representing said distortion
and a reflectivity component representing said characteristics of said
geological formations,
applying said last-named signal to said smoothing filter to smooth the
spectrum of said signal thereby separating said distortion component from
said reflectivity component,
applying the output of said smoothing filter, representing said distortion component, to said inverter to produce as an output of said inverter the
coefficients of a filter which is the inverse of said distortion component,
applying said coefficients to said inverse filter to provide an inverse
filter having filtering which is the inverse of the distortion operator, and
applying said geophysical data to said inverse filter to produce an
output emphasizing said characteristics of said geological formations.
The other claim, Claim No. 4, was rejected for reasons unconnected with the fact
that it was cast in a conventional process claim form. Id.
107. See notes 72-73 supra and accompanying text.
108. References to the nonanalogous use problem can be found in Comment,
supra note 48, at 480, and Hamlin, supra note 93, at 581.
109. In re Foster, 438 F.2d 1011, 1016, 169 U.S.P.Q. 99, 102, 2 CLSR 994, 1001
(C.C.P.A. 1971). See also, In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1002, 173 U.S.P.Q. 430, 434,
3 CLSR 173, 180 (C.C.P.A. 1972); In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1400, 163 U.S.P.Q.
611, 616, 2 CLSR 359, 366 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
110. 146 F.2d 817, 64 U.S.P.Q. 278 (9th Cir. 1944). See also, the analysis by Judge
Smith in Prater1, 415 F.2d at 1386, 159 U.S.P.Q. at 591, 2 CLSR at 20-21.
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claims. A quotation from PraterI provides an appropriate introduction to the continuing attempts by the Patent Office to bootstrap a
variety of patentability disqualifications onto the "mental steps" bar:
The examiner's position before the board, as set forth in his
Answer, includes a rejection of the method claims for failure to
comply with 35 U.S.C. 101, 102 and 112. A sequence of initial steps
of reasoning adopted by the examiner in this rejection, is: (1) that
if the invention is to fall within a statutory class under section 101
it must be as a 'process'; (2) that the claims are readable upon a
mental process; and (3) claims to a mental process are unpatentable (in support of which proposition the examiner quotes portions of In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 38 CCPA 945 (1951)). The
examiner then proceeds with development of the rejection in two
alternative forms.
In the first form of the rejection under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and
102, the examiner argues, on the one hand, that if the novel part
of a claim is readable on subject matter which is unpatentable
because it is outside the statutory classes of patentable subject
matter, then the claim as a whole is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101; and, on the other hand, if the claim reads on the physical
process of a person marking paper during calculation by hand,
then the claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
In the second form of the rejection, under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101
and 112, the examiner argues that if the claim covers subject
matter outside the statutory classes (as well as subject matter
within the statute) then the claim fails to particularly point out
and distinctly claim the invention, as required by 35 U.S.C. §
112.111
The roots and preprogram history of the "mental steps" doctrine
have been traced exhaustively elsewhere. 112 The thrust of the earlier
cases was that a process which specifically claimed steps disclosed as
performed mentally-and particularly if requiring interpretive procedures-was nonstatutory subject matter. On the other hand, these early
cases established that "[a] method is not per se unpatentable because
its practice requires that the operator thereof must think,""' an observation perhaps too obvious to mention.
Program-related processes do not, in fact, require human thought,
interpretive or otherwise, in performing those steps associated with the
computer. The real focus of the "mental steps" doctrine in this area has
been upon process claims which are readablein some fashion on mental
implementation (or its equivalent-pencil-and-paper practice). Early
111. Id. at 1381, 159 U.S.P.Q. at 586-87, 2 CLSR at 14 (emphasis in original).
112. See, e.g., McClaskey, The Mental Process Doctrine:Its Origin,Legal Basis
and Scope, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1148 (1970); Sutton, The "Mental Steps" Doctrine:A
CriticalAnalysis in the Light of Praterand Wei, 13 IDEA 458 (1969), reprintedin 52
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 479 (1970).
113. Ex parte Bond, 135 U.S.P.Q. 160, 162 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1961).
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hopes that the "mental steps" objection could be avoided by the disclosure of fully automatic machines 14 were not fulfilled, as the Government's Prater argument revealed.11 Of couse, claims that definitely
read on nonstatutory subject matter will necessarily fail. 116 Therefore,
attempts to rescue programs from rejection on this ground have followed two basic approaches: on the one hand, denying that the mental
processes in question are or ought to be relevant to the subject matter
issue and, on the other hand, asserting that claims to a program-related
process do not read on mental activity.
The line of reasoning on the irrelevance of mental processes is as
follows: (a) infringement is a tort; (b) torts require "acts" and harm to
the patentee; (c) mental practice, which is neither an "act" nor harmful,
cannot infringe; and (d) mental practice should therefore not be an
issue, since "monopolization" by patent necessarily entails the power to
bring infringement actions.1 7 In a similar vein, it has been argued that
claims reading on mental practice in the abstract should nevertheless
stand if no person would, in fact, practice the invention mentally." 8 The
Prater invention provides an obvious example of such a claim, since the
claimed process involved selecting one subset of ten equations from
among 184,756 possible subsets." 9
A more adventuresome task is to argue that the claimed thought is
not, or ought not to be considered, nonstatutory subject matter. The
Supreme Court held as early as 1863 that "ideas" were not patentable. 2 ' Recently, it was asserted that, by virtue of their alleged
relationship to thought, program-related process patents raised
constitutional questions under the first, ninth, and tenth amendments.' 2 ' The response of the pro-patent community has been a series of
efforts to distinguish patentable mental activity from that which is
nonpatentable. One variant has been to suggest coverage for all processes, mental or otherwise, as long as they are commercial or industrial
in nature. 22 The following rumination illustrates this line of reasoning:
114. See, e.g., Note, The Patentabilityof Computer Programs,38 N.Y.U.L. REV.
891, 909 (1963).
115. PraterII, 415 F.2d at 1399-1400, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 546-47, 2 CLSR at 41.
116. See notes 88-89 supra and accompanying text.
117. Falk, Mental Steps and the PatentLaw-A Rumination,8 PAT L. ANN. 203,
212 (1970). This argument was also made by Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., in its
amicus brief in PraterII. See 415 F.2d at 1400 n.20, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 547 n.20, 2 CLSR
at 42 n.20.
118. Kayton, supra note 73, at B-43 to B-44, reprinted in 9 JURIMETRICS J. at 13840.
119. 415 F.2d at 1395 n.13, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 543 n.13, 2 CLSR at 35 n.13.
120. Burr v. Duryea, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 570 (1863).
121. Brief for B.E.M.A., supra note 54, at 12. This was also raised by the Solicitor
General in his petition in Prater.See PraterI, 415 F.2d at 1400 n.20, 162 U.S.P.Q. at
547 n.20, 2 CLSR at 42 n.20.
122. McClaskey, supra note 112, at 1195.
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Why is pure mathematics non-statutory? I have found no
authority but I think the reason is that historically, mathematics
has not been a "useful art" in the constitutional sense because,
historically, there has been no immediate correlation between
the discovery of a mathematical relationship and the implementation of that relationship in the physical, tangible world of ma123
chines.
Another effort has been to distinguish various qualities of human
thought, asking: "Are the steps involving human intervention. . of
the type that require subjective interpretation or are they merely responses that are clearly defined and could, for example, be per-formed
[sic] by logic circuitry or apparatus?"' 124 The line can be drawn even
more favorably by relegating to the status of nonstatutory only those
12
thought processes that cannot be machine-implemented.
The second principal response to the "mental steps" objection is to
deny that the claim reads on a mental process at all. The evolution of
claim-limiting language satisfactory to the C.C.P.A. in this regard is
traced below in the discussion of disclosure requirements. 12 However,
mere claim limitations do not meet the contention that it is impossible
to draft claims to program inventions that do not read on mental
practice. One author seemed to adopt this view in asserting that
"[p]atentability cannot depend upon the intelligence represented." 1 27 In
other words, a program algorithm cannot supply the novelty required
by the "new and useful. . .process" language of section 101 because it
is itself nonstatutory. 12 8 A similar view is reflected in the following
quotation: "While the computer operates by physical equivalents of
logical functions, the functions themselves are the same procedures
which a human being would perform in working the same computa29
tion.',1
The response to such assertions has been to stress the differences
between thought and program processes; specifically, by pointing out
that information is physically represented in computers and that machine processes do not, in fact, duplicate human thought processes.' 30
Patent proponents, attempting to widen the conceptual gap be123. Popper, Current Status of PatentProtectionfor ProgrammableProcesses,
7 PAT. L. ANN. 37, 42-43 (1969) (emphasis in original).
124. Falk, supra note 117, at 215 (emphasis omitted).
125. Nimtz, The Patentabilityof Computer Programs,1 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS
& L. 38, 45 (1970).
126. See notes 213-57 infra and accompanying text.
127. Galbi, The Unpatentabilityof ComputerPrograms,5 PAT. L. ANN. 147,171
(1967).
128. Id. See also, Puckett, supra note 44, at 116.
129. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,175 U.S.P.Q. 673,
3 CLSR 256 (1972).
130. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 43, at 374.
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tween mental and program processes, have also stressed the similarities
between software and hardware implementation. The following dicta
from Ex Parte Egan 3 ' is frequently cited on this point:
We agree that the process under consideration is properly
analogous to a method of operating a computer, since the charts
employed are quite analogous to a preconstructed computer. The
method operations in operating a computer are distinct from the
method of computation itself. It is perfectly possible to have a
patentable process in which apparatus is used in a particular
way to get a useful result.'3 2
This passage has been interpreted as taking "for granted that computer programs are patentable,' ' 133 but some qualification is necessary.
Not only were "programs" not mentioned as such, but Egan distin34
guished the use of the charts from the method of their construction
(which may well have been unpatentable as "mathematical computations"). Thus, the quoted dicta does not address the patentability of a
"program" conceived as a method of configuring a "preconstructed
computer." In any case, the Patent Office Board of Appeals has demonstrated a different attitude toward programs in recent years, and the
primary employment of analogies between hardware
and software has
135
been in defense of apparatus, not method, claims.
The particular uses of the "mental steps" doctrine discussed above
do not begin to exhaust its flexibility as a springboard for assertions
that program processes are nonstatutory. The doctrine has evolved from
a relatively narrow, albeit challenged, preoccupation with human participation in claimed processes, to at least moral support for assertions
that claims to totally automatic process steps threaten our "intellectual
patrimony" 136 and seek monopolies on "scientific truths.' ' 137 The "mental steps" doctrine has been characterized as a "shibboleth," 138 and
with some justice, having become, in the hands of the Patent Office, a
conclusionary label for a "mixed bag" of weak objections to programrelated processes.' 3 9
131. 129 U.S.P.Q. 23 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1960). The opinion upheld the patentability of a method for measuring the depth of well bores that required making entries
on a series of specially constructed charts.
132. Id. at 26.
133. Note, supra note 114, at 894.
134. 129 U.S.P.Q. at 26-27.
135. See notes 235-37 & 255 infra and accompanying text.
136. Reply Memorandum for Petitioner at 2, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972).
137. Brief for Honeywell, Inc., supra note 50, at 2.
138. Falk, supra note 117, at 203.
139. This is not to say that the policy concerns underlying earlier versions of the
doctrine were misplaced or that all attacks upon the doctrine have been wellfounded.
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"Functionof a Machine" Doctrine

Explicit statutory authority for "processes" as patentable subject
matter first appeared in the Patent Act of 1952.140 While processes had
been accorded patent protection prior to 1952 by judicial interpretation
of the "useful arts" category, this occurred only after prolonged, evolutionary development in the last half of the nineteenth century.14 1 In the
course of that evolution, the Supreme Court, on several occasions,
granted patents on apparatus while denying claims to the general operation of the same apparatus. The following dicta in Corning v. Burden 1 2 is frequently cited: "It is well settled that a man cannot have a
patent for the function or abstract effect of a machine, but only for the
1 43
machine which produces it.'
Although process patents were subsequently upheld in several
cases, the language of Corning was echoed in Risdon Locomotive Works
v. Medart,'" in which the Court denied coverage for "a process which
involved nothing more than the operation of a piece of mechanism, or,
1 45
in other words, for the function of a machine.'
Soon thereafter, the functional predecessor of the C.C.P.A. declared that "a process, which amounts to no more than the mere function of a machine, is not patentable' ' 146 unless "the process may be
performed by hand or by another mechanism than that exhibited, although perhaps not with equal efficacy.' 1 47 This doctrine prevailed in
148
the C.C.P.A. until the late 1960's.
Early writers on program-related patents recognized that claims to
processes might be vulnerable to the "function of a machine" objection.
It was commonly felt that the disclosure of alternative hardware
configurations to carry out the same algorithm could avoid the problem, 149 although at least one commentator doubted that such alternatives could be disclosed adequately without a crushing burden of hardware detail. 150 The possibility that the doctrine might be avoided by
disclosure of alternative pencil-and-paper practice was also raised, 151
140. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).

141. 1 A.

DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 12 (2d ed. 1964).
56 U.S. (15 How.) 252 (1853).
Id. at 268.
158 U.S. 68 (1894).
Id. at 77.
In re Weston, 17 App. D.C. 431, 442 (1901).
Id.
See notes 152-54 infra and accompanying text.
See Richards, Recent Developments in PatentLaw, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, PATENT PROCUREMENT AND EXPLOITATION 97, 115 (1963); Note,
supra note 114, at 907-08.
150. Puckett, supra note 44, at 112.
151. Richards, supra note 149, at 117-18. The author relied on Exparte Mills, 131

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
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but not pressed in later discussions, since pencil-and-paper practice of
computational steps is clearly "mental" activity and directly raises the
"mental steps" doctrine.
The 1968 case of In re Tarczy-Hornoch,152 involving claims to an
analog pulse-sorting device, terminated the "function of a machine"
doctrine. In Tarczy-Hornoch the C.C.P.A. found that the doctrine was
supported neither by actual Supreme Court holdings nor by policy
considerations.'5 3 Foes of program patents raised the "function of a
machine" objection again in Benson, asking the Supreme Court to
overturn the Tarczy-Hornoch holding on the ground that it flew in the
face of prior Supreme Court rulings. 15 4 The Court made no mention of
either Tarczy-Hornoch or the "function of a machine" doctrine in its
opinion.
(3) End Use Problems
The "function of a machine" objection rested upon the alleged
failure of the applicant to disclose alternative ways of reaching a particular result. A related, but distinguishable, set of problems arose
concerning the perception that certain claims are not confined to an
appropriate set of end uses. These problems can be separated into those
relating to "field of use" limitations and those relating to the qualities
of disclosed end uses.
"Field of use" limitations are accomplished by reciting in a claim at
least one process step which limits the claim to practice in a particular
industrial or technological area. 5 5 Such limitations have been thought
by some to be both necessary and adequate to overcome subject matter
difficulties, 56 although the set of acceptable "field of use" candidates
has not been well-defined. Some who otherwise oppose program-related patents suggest that the "field of use" need not extend beyond the
data processing industry, arguing that "systems programs"' 57 or
"control techniques"' 58 are patentable as steps in processes that begin
and end with the manipulation of peripheral equipment.
U.S.P.Q. 331 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1961), where the specification disclosed an analog
device, but the allowed claim was not limited by structural language. In fact, the
Patent Office had argued in Mills that the claim failed as an "inherent function of
the disclosed apparatus" because, inter alia, "it is not apparent that the recited
method could be performed by hand." Id. at 333. Since the "mental steps" issue was
not before the Board, the case can only be taken as an uncertain foundation for an
inference that the Patent Office might have acquiesced had pencil-and-paper
practice been disclosed.
152. 397 F.2d 856, 158 U.S.P.Q. 141 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
153. Id. at 857, 158 U.S.P.Q. at 142.
154. See, e.g., Brief for IBM, supra note 49, at 24-25.
155. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 149, at 117.
156. Id. at 105, 117; Note, supra note 114, at 903.
157. Puckett, supra note 44, at 116.
158. Galbi, supra note 127, at 157.
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The qualitative test for proper "end use" limitations typically relies
on the language of Cochrane v. Deener,1 9 which, it is argued, limited patentable processes to those which act to change specified materials to a "different state or thing."' 16 Processes which include steps of
manipulating physical matter subsequent to computational steps avoid
the Cochrane barrier. The critical issue has been whether internal
computer processes are statutory under this test.
The 1966 proposed Patent Office Guidelines characterized such
processes as "mathematical" and hence barred by the Cochrane doctrine.' 61 The theme was repeated in the guidelines issued in 1968:
A process or method is directed to patentable subject matter
only if it is performed on physical materials and produces some
appreciable change in their character or condition; In re Shao
Wen Yuan, 1951 C.D. 286, 38 C.C.P.A. 967, 89 USPQ 324;
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 1877 C.D. 242. Accordingly, a
computer programming process which produces no more than a
numerical, statistical or other informational result is not directed
to patentable subject matter. Such a process may, however, form
a part of a patentable invention if it is combined in an unobvious
manner with physical steps of the character above referred to as,
for example, in the knitting of a pattern or the shaping of
metal.162

Patent proponents have attempted to avoid the application of
Cochrane by arguing that program-related claims refer to changes in
memory device states rather than to numerical manipulation, 6 3 and by
asserting that The Telephone Cases6 4 established the equivalence of
changes in substances and electromagnetic alterations for subject matter purposes.1 65 Proponents also claim that the "test" of Cochrane,
159. 94 U.S. 780 (1876).
160. That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular form of
the instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed. If one of the steps of a
process be that a certain substance is to be reduced to a powder, it may not
be at all material what instrument or machinery is used to effect that
object, whether a hammer, a pestle and mortar, or a mill. Either may be
pointed out; but if the patent is not confined to that particular tool or
machine, the use of the others would be an infringement, the general
process being the same. A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed
upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state
or thing.
Id. at 787-88.
161. PROPOSED GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at 865.

162.

UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE, GUIDELINES TO EXAMINATION OF PROGRAMS,

855 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 829, 830 (Oct. 22, 1968), reprinted in the Appendix in this
issue.
163. Note, supra note 114, at 904.
164. 126 U.S. 1 (1887).
165. Kayton, supra note 73, at B-40. See also, McClaskey, supra note 112, at 1155-
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whatever its original force, was altered by subsequent decisions and
that "[a]s long as the process embodies physical materials, agents and
effects, and produces a novel and useful result, it is patentable."' 66 The
Pratercase was expected to settle the "acting on materials" issue167 and
was said to have done so, 168 although the statements to that effect in
PraterI were simply obiter dicta. 6 9 By the time of the Benson appeal,
however, the Supreme Court was being asked to revive the Cochrane
doctrine. 7 '
(4)

"Preemption"Doctrine

In appealing the Benson case, the Government argued the irrelevance of the contention of the C.C.P.A. that no one would want to
practice the invention by pencil and paper:
It is surely not proper to grant what would otherwise be an
undeserved and therefore objectionable patent monopoly merely
because it appears at the time of the grant that it is impossible
that anyone will 171in the future desire to practice the subject matter of the grant.
The Supreme Court stood this argument on its head and struck the
preempt other uses of the
claims on the ground that they in fact would
172
algorithm lying at the point of novelty.
An attorney active in the program-related patent arena had once
declared that "a patent to a . . . program would not cover the mathematics used to develop it; it would merely cover the operation of a
machine in accordance with the program."'' 7 3 Other observers, however,
had voiced concern that such patents would effectively control the
mathematics where computer implementation was the only feasible
mode of practice,1 74 and the Benson court was well briefed on this
possibility, with such examples as the Simplex and Monte Carlo techniques.175 Whether the Benson holding would reach attempts to claim
166. Comment, supra note 48, at 482, relying on Waxham v. Smith, 294 U.S. 20
(1935).
167. Kurtz, Examples of Inventions Embodying Software, Types of Disclosures
and Claims, in PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, supra note 45, at 160, 189.
168. Sutton, supra note 112, at 463.
169. Obiter dicta is a legal term defined as "words of a prior opinion entirely
unnecessary for the decision of the case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1222 (4th rev.
ed. 1968).
170. Brief for IBM, supra note 49, at 10-11. See also notes 349-52 supra and
accompanying text.
171. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 129, at 24 n.24.
172. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 676, 3 CLSR 256, 262
(1972).
173. Jacobs, Patents, in McOustra, Legal Protectionfor Computer Programs
(Report of the Law Panelon Legal Protectionfor ComputerPrograms,Third IFIP
Congress,May 27, 1965), 8 COMPUTER J. 289, 291 (1966).
174. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 48, at 488 n.114.
175. Brief for IBM, supra note 49, at 16.
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techniques of the latter type, however, is one of the many uncertainties
176
generated by the Court's opinion.
b. "Machine" Claims
"Machine" or "apparatus" claims to program innovations have
been drawn to programmed computers, either in isolation or as components of more extensive systems. The cases reveal eight apparatus
claims, four of which were rejected for reasons unrelated to section
101177 and four of which were upheld. 1 78 All were cast in the "meansplus-function" form authorized by the last paragraph of section 112.179
Claim 19 in Bernhart is typical:
A system ... comprising in combination: electronic digital
computer means programmed to respond to applied signals...;
signal means coupled with said computer means... ; and planar
180
plotting means coupled with said computer means ....
A contention implicit in such claims is that a programmed computer is, for legal purposes, a different machine from the same computer in an unprogrammed or differently programmed state. 181 Opponents of such claims have denied that programming in fact creates a
"new" or "different" machine. Claims to a programmed computer have
been analogized to claims on a machine with its switches set in a
peculiar arrangement and to claims by a gearbox inventor to "forward"
176. See notes 343-54 infra and accompanying text.
177. Claim No. 18, In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1401, 163 U.S.P.Q. 611, 613-14, 2
CLSR 359, 360-63 (C.C.P.A. 1969); Claim No. 9, In re Brown, 477 F.2d 946, 949, 177
U.S.P.Q. 691,693, 4 CLSR 56,59-60 (C.C.P.A. 1973); Claim No. 1, In re Knowlton, 481
F.2d 1357, 1361-62, 178 U.S.P.Q. 486, 489, 4 CLSR 799, 805-06 (C.C.P.A. 1973); Claim
No. 9, In re Brandstadter, 484 F.2d 1395, 1400,179 U.S.P.Q. 286,289,4 CLSR 976,982
(C.C.P.A. 1973).
178. Claim No. 10, PraterII, 415 F.2d at 1397-98, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 545, 2 CLSR at
38; Claim No. 19, In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1397-98, 163 U.S.P.Q. 611, 614, 2
CLSR 359,362-63 (C.C.P.A. 1969); Claim No. 26, In re Foster, 438 F.2d 1011, 1014,169
U.S.P.Q. 99, 100, 2 CLSR 994, 997-98 (C.C.P.A. 1971); Claim No. 20, In re Johnston,
502 F.2d 765, 767, 183 U.S.P.Q. 172, 174, 4 CLSR 1491, 1494-95 (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 189 U.S.P.Q. 257, 5
CLSR 1133 (1976).
179. See note 26 supra.
180. In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1397-98, 163 U.S.P.Q. 611, 614, 2 CLSR 359,
362-63 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
181. Program patent applications do not claim "programs" as such, which have
been characterized elsewhere in machine terms as the "control mechanism of the
programmed computer." Jacobs, supra note 60, at B-77 to B-79. Instead, applications claim the programmed machine. To further strengthen the "machine" image
of programs, proponents repeatedly stress the "engineering equivalence" of software and hardware implementations. Explanation of this "engineering equivalence" theory, however, rarely goes beyond the observation that when innovators
are confronted with a choice between hardware or software implementations, "the
particular approach that is used is essentially an engineering decision.
Id. at
B-79.
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and "reverse," the judicial sanction of which would be a "contravention
182
of common sense.
It has also been said that programming does not create a new
apparatus because it "is merely another word for operating a computer."' 83 Other objections to machine claims have relied on analogies
to phenomena denied protection by the Supreme Court in past cases,
such as the mere "packaging" of otherwise unpatentable components, 184 or particular player-piano rolls in combination with a playerpiano.'8 5 Such arguments were flatly rejected by the C.C.P.A. in In re
Bernhart, where the court said: "If a machine is programmed in a
certain new and unobvious way, it is physically different from the
machine without that program.' '186
The C.C.P.A. has also rejected attempts by the Patent Office to
apply process claim doctrines to machine claims. Among these attempts
was the contention that such devices were not "machines" because they
were "predicated on mental steps" at their point of novelty and hence
did not contain structural differences over the prior art.'8 7 Also rejected
were contentions that claims reciting structural language were readable on human beings 8 8 and that patents on program-related apparatus
would preempt the underlying algorithm.'8 9 Finally, the C.C.P.A. in In
re Johnston9 ° declared that the control of algorithms by a machine
claim, even if possible, was legally irrelevant.' 9 '
2. Anticipation: Section 102
Section 102 of the Patent Code denies patentability to an invention
which was "known or used" in the United States prior to its invention
by the patent applicant. 192 Patent Office "anticipation" objections to
computer program-related claims have generally relied on two theories:
(1) That subject matter which is nonstatutory in its own right
could not distinguish the invention, and the invention was
therefore anticipated because the general-purpose computer
182. Puckett, supra note 44, at 107-08.
183. Galbi, supra note 127, at 165.
184. Brief for IBM, supra note 49, at 23, referringto Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 76 U.S.P.Q. 280 (1948).
185. Brief for Petitioner; supra note 129, at 33 n.32, referring to White-Smith
Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (a copyright case).
186. 417 F.2d 1395, 1400, 163 U.S.P.Q. 611, 616, 2 CLSR 359, 366 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
187. Id. at 1398, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 614, 2 CLSR at 363.
188. Id. at 1399, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 615, 2 CLSR at 364-65.
189. Id. at 1399, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 616, 2 CLSR at 365-66.
190. 502 F.2d 765, 183 U.S.P.Q. 172, 4 CLSR 1491 (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 189 U.S.P.Q. 257, 5 CLSR 1133
(1976).
191. Id. at 771-72, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 177, 4 CLSR at 1502-03.
192. See note 15 supra.
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itself was "old;"' 193 and,
were anticipated by such devices as
(2) That apparatus claims
94
pencils and paper.
These objections, founded on section 101 theories of the Patent Office,
were overturned when the C.C.P.A. rejected the underlying subject
matter premise as previously described. 9 5
Anticipation arguments have also been based on the assertion that
the digital computer fully anticipates all of its programmed configurations. A representative of a hardware manufacturer once argued that "a
program's logic design is contemplated fully in the design of the computer."' 1 6 Such arguments have been answered by alternative characterizations of an unprogramned, general-purpose digital computer as a
"plugboard"' 9 7 or "an array of independent space-distributed instrumentalities.' 1 98 Even the Patent Office was at one time disposed to
see an unprogrammed computer as "a 'warehouse' of unrelated
parts."' 199 Computers have been described as "incomplete" without pro-

grams, 200 a condition in fact cultivated by their manufacturers: "That a
latent functional capacity is enough for anticipation . .. is clearly
untenable . . . .Indeed, the goal of the hardware organizer is the
preservation of the maximum freedom of action for program intervention or organization."

20 1

This dispute finally ended when the C.C.P.A. ruled that a programmed computer was a "new machine. ' 20 It is unlikely that the
anticipation issue will be seriously urged in the future.
3. Inventor: Sections 101 and 102
Sections 101 and 102 require that the patent application be filed by
the inventor of the subject matter of the application. 2 3 Some writers
193. See, e.g., PraterII, 415 F.2d at 1398-99, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 545-46, 2 CLSR at 3840.
194. Id.
195. See notes 110-16 supra and accompanying text.
196. Statement before the Patent Office hearings on Proposed Guidelines, Oct.
4,1966, reported in Hirsch, The PatentOffice Examines Software: GuidelinesGet
Graded Down, 12 DATAMATION, Nov. 1966, at 79, 81. See also Comment, supra note
48, at 475; Puckett, supra note 44, at 120; Brief for IBM, supra note 49, at 3.
197. Hamlin, supra note 93, at 581.
198. Eltgroth, Software and the Patent Law, 4 PAT. L. ANN. 1 (1966).
199. PROPOSED GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at 866. Such a position would seem to
support the contentions of patent proponents that introducing a program into a
computer creates a different machine. See notes 181-86 supra and accompanying
text.
200. Jacobs, supra note 59, at 10, reprintedin 7 CoM. ACM at 584.
201. Eltgroth, supra note 198, at 4-5.
202. See note 186 supra and accompanying text.
203. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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have visualized potential difficulties in selecting the proper "inventors"
of program-related innovations for filing purposes. From one perspective, the programmer might have to be joined by additional persons.
One commentator opined that applications containing apparatus
claims may have to be signed by hardware designers, 20 4 and another
wondered if the author of the compiler or assembler would have to be
included when claims covered object programs. 20 5 An alternative perspective suggested that the programmer need not sign at all since
26
programming is "automatic" given the algorithm or flowchart.
These issues have received no judicial treatment and it is unlikely
that they are grounds for concern. At most, the problem of identifying
the set of "inventors" of computer software is no more difficult than
that encountered in other areas of technology.
4.

Nonobviousness: Section 103

Assuming that an invention is not actually anticipated, to be patentable it must mark such an advance over the relevant prior art that it
would not have been obvious to persons of ordinary skill in that art.207
The Patent Office has attempted to couple section 103 objections to
subject matter theories, arguing that nonstatutory subject matter (i.e.,
algorithms) could not distinguish program-related inventions from the
prior art. That effort was frustrated by the C.C.P.A. in Prater 1.208
More substantial questions are raised by the conventional application of section 103 to program-related claims. Four claims have been
rejected by the C.C.P.A. on the basis of prior art cited by the Patent
Office. 20 9 Other claims appearing obvious, at least at the time of trial,
have escaped section 103 challenge, possibly for one or more of the
following reasons:
(1) The Patent Office preferred for tactical reasons to rest its
opposition on theories of more general effect.
(2) Obviousness is tested against the art and programmer skill
level existing at the filing date, which typically precedes
litigation by six or seven years in program-related cases.
(3) There does not exist an adequate file of current art, let alone
a collection of art historically organized.21 0
204. Rackman, Re: Legal Protection of Computer Programs,48 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 275, 277 (1966).
205. Puckett, supra note 44, at 117.
206. Seminar A: Patent Procurement, Session Two, 4 PAT. L. ANN. 201, 209
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Session Two].
207. See note 17 supra.
208. 415 F.2d 1393, 162 U.S.P.Q. 541, 2 CLSR 32 (C.C.P.A. 1969). See notes 278-89
infra and accompanying text.
209. Claim Nos. 8, 13 & 18, In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1401, 163 U.S.P.Q. 611,
615, 2 CLSR 359, 368 (C.C.P.A. 1969); Claim No. 1, In re Knowlton, 481 F.2d 1357,
1369, 178 U.S.P.Q. 486, 489, 4 CLSR 799, 818 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
210. See notes 474-78 infra and accompanying text.
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Some commentators have been confident that a significant number
of program-related innovations will be able to pass section 103 muster."' Others have expressed strong doubt. 212 The case law to date has
not shed much light on the question.
5.

Specification: Section 112

Section 112 requires that inventions be adequately disclosed and
precisely claimed. 213 In practical application these requirements overlap: elements recited in the claims constitute part of the disclosure, and
the adequacy of claim language is measured in light of the specification
as a whole. 214 However, the legal doctrines based on section 112 are
generally either claim or disclosure-oriented.
The Patent Office initially cast the claim requirements of section
112 in a role ancillary to its subject matter theories: claims reading on
nonstatutory phenomena, it was argued, failed to "particularly point
out and distinctly claim" the invention. The C.C.P.A. rejected the subject matter objections in PraterII, holding that claims must read only
on subject matter which the applicant intends to claim. 21 5 Since no
applicant has been so bold as to lay explicit claim to mental practice,
this holding led to a series of terminological exercises in later cases.
Possible human implementation was found in "generating physical
representations"21' 6 and in processing "signals. ' 217 On the other hand,
the following expressions were held to limit claims to machine implementation only: "a general purpose digital computer";218 "bit" and
"bit stream";219 "electrical signals";220 and "re-entrant shift register,"
"shifting," "masking," and "storing." 221
All of the litigated apparatus claims to program-related inventions
have been cast in the "means-plus-function" form authorized by the
last paragraph of section 112.222 Such claims are potentially vulnerable
211. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 46, at 92.
212. Eltgroth, supra note 198, at 7.
213. See note 21 supra.
214. See notes 22-25 & 31 supra and accompanying text.
215. 415 F.2d at 1404, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 550, 2 CLSR at 49.
216. Id. at 1405, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 551, 2 CLSR at 49.
217. In re Foster, 438 F.2d 1011, 1016, 169 U.S.P.Q. 99, 102, 2 CLSR 994, 1001
(C.C.P.A. 1971).
218. In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1396, 163 U.S.P.Q. 611, 613, 2 CLSR 359, 361
(C.C.P.A. 1969).
219. In re Mahony, 421 F.2d 742, 745, 164 U.S.P.Q. 572, 575, 2 CLSR 587, 592
(C.C.P.A. 1970).
220. In re Foster, 438 F.2d 1011, 1016, 169 U.S.P.Q. 99, 102, 2 CLSR 994, 1001
(C.C.P.A. 1971).
221. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 686-87, 169 U.S.P.Q. 548, 552, 2 CLSR 1030, 103839 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q.
67, 3 CLSR 256 (1972).
222. See note 26 supra.
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to the "multiple recitation" doctrine when disclosed structural elements can be characterized as performing more than one of the claimed
functions.22 3 Commentators have questioned the availability of the
means-plus-function format for this reason. 22 4 In In re Knowlton 225 the
Patent Office Board of Appeals held a means-plus-function claim indefinite because the same hardware elements would perform various
functions during execution:
There is no more a combination of the two apparatus configurations than there would be a combination, in the usual sense,
between a radio transmitter and a radio receiver when the latter
has been constructed from various parts taken from the
226
former.
This ruling could not survive the C.C.P.A.'s holding that the claimed
"apparatus" was a computer at the instant the program was fully
loaded. 227 From that perspective, a more accurate analogy was "a
combination transmitter-receiver in which a single element, or a part of
the circuitry, plays a different role depending on whether the instru'228
ment is being used to transmit or receive.
Disclosure is the other major focus of section 112, which requires
that the specification describe the invention in "full, clear, concise, and
exact terms;" that it teach its making and usage to "any person skilled
in the art;" and that the "best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention" be set forth. 229 Adequate disclosure is a
critical part of the patent applicant's contribution to society in return
for which he receives the power to bring infringement actions. Yet, the
applicant's self-interest dictates that he minimize such disclosure and
thereby maintain greater control over the information at the core of his
invention. Furthermore, circuitous disclosure practices have been encouraged by the automatically negative Patent Office response to explicitly claimed software.
Disclosure requirements for program-related inventions have been
only adumbrated by the cases to date. In In re Brandstadter23 it was
held that if another user would be put to " . . . unreasonable experimentation and delays for him to come into possession of the ap223. In re Knowlton, 481 F.2d 1357, 1367, 178 U.S.P.Q. 486, 493, 4 CLSR 799,813
(C.C.P.A. 1973).
224. See, e.g., Popper, Method Claims for ProgrammableProcesses,in THE LAW
supra note 60, at B-55, B-67; Comment, supra note 48, at 479.
225. 481 F.2d 1357, 178 U.S.P.Q. 486, 4 CLSR 799 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
226. Id. at 1363, 178 U.S.P.Q. at 490, 4 CLSR at 807.
227. . . . [W]hen applicant's program is fully loaded into the computer the
stored pattern of signals transforms the unprogrammed machine into a

OF SOFTWARE,

new structure ....

Id. at 1368, 178 U.S.P.Q. at 494, 4 CLSR at 815.
228. Id. (emphasis in original).

229. See note 21 supra.
230. 484 F.2d 1395, 179 U.S.P.Q. 286, 4 CLSR 976 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
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paratus that could carry out the invention, a disclosure thus deficient
'
would not be adequate legal consideration for a grant of a patent."2 31
The content of that test, however, is far from clear, since in Brandstadter the applicant failed to give the Patent Office either an estimate of
the time required to prepare the program, or even a skeletal flow23 2
chart.
Affidavits by third parties are admissible to show that the specification, in fact, adequately teaches the invention; but they are only
"some evidence" on the question, particularly if not well-larded with
factual details of the affiants' experience with the invention. 233 Extended discussions between the inventor and the affiant can totally vitiate
the probative value of such evidence.23 4
The cases have also provided some indication of the modes of
hardware and software disclosure acceptable to the C.C.P.A.
a. Software Disclosure
It seems obvious that applications for program-related patents
should be required to disclose software. However, early Patent Office
resistance to such disclosures induced efforts to achieve program
coverage by disclosing only analog implementations and relying on the
doctrine of equivalents in later infringement actions. This strategem
was apparently in use as early as 1954,235 and persisted for some time
thereafter, 236 although increasingly complex algorithms made many
inventions too cumbersome for disclosure in this fashion by the mid-

1960s.237
There have been numerous objections to this practice. If, in fact, the
inventor regards a program-implemented process or device as his true
invention, mere analog disclosure would fail the section 112 test enunciated in PraterI1.238 It would also fail to teach the invention to the
presumably relevant practitioners-programmers-who are generally
not trained to understand and implement analog schematics, and it
would certainly not reveal the contemplated "best mode" of carrying
out the invention. 239 Moreover, some believe that the practice may
231. Id. at 1406, 179 U.S.P.Q. at 294, 4 CLSR at 993, quoting from In re Ghiron,
442 F.2d 985, 169 U.S.P.Q. 723, 3 CLSR 70 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
232. Id. at 1406, 179 U.S.P.Q. at 295, 4 CLSR at 992-93.
233. Id. at 1406, 176 U.S.P.Q. at 294, 4 CLSR at 992.
234. It has been held that.'several' meetings, each lasting no longer than two
hours" were enough to cast doubt on the affidavit. In re Brown, 477 F.2d 946, 952,
177 U.S.P.Q. 691, 695, 4 CLSR 56, 63 (C.C.P.A. 1973). See also note 360 infra and
accompanying text.
235. See Miller, Software Patents Today, 10 PAT. L. ANN. 151, 152 (1972).
236. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 149, at 108.
237. Miller, supra note 235, at 153.
238. 415 F.2d at 1404-05, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 550-51, 2 CLSR at 49.
239. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), quoted in note 21 supra. Cf. Note,
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constitute "fraud on the Patent Office" and therefore block enforce240
ment of any patent so issued.
Clearly the most important question regarding mere analog disclosure is whether software implementations would be held to infringe
patents issued on such inventions. Some commentators believe that
software practice would be covered; 241 others doubt it. 242 However, it
would certainly be anomalous to find infringement by a software implementation which had been defined as unpatentable subject matter in
its own right. Moreover, assuming that apparatus claims (or even process claims) to program-related inventions are finally held valid, the
extension of claims covering an analog invention to software would
amplify the control over algorithms
which disturbed the Supreme
2 43
Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.
Yet, given that program implementation is revealed, it is not clear
what form of software disclosure is required. Prelitigation commentators generally supposed that mere recitation of formulas would not
suffice. 244 Discussions of this issue have primarily concentrated on the
need and advisability of disclosing program listings rather than merely
flowcharts. The case for requiring full program listings has been argued
on the bases of more adequate teaching, 245 a consequently diminished
possibility of Patent Office challenge on section 112 grounds, 246 and
better protection in infringement actions. 247 Listing requirements have
also been urged to prevent foreclosure of new programming areas by
parties carrying new developments only to the flowchart stage and then
filing patent applications with no intention of writing the actual pro2 48
gram.
Adequate Legal Protectionfor Computer Programs, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 369, 375
n.42

240. Banzhaf, (Letter to Editor), 7 DATA

PROCESSING MAGAZINE,

Jan. 1975, at 13;

Falk, Potential Changes in the PatentLaw, in PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, supra
note 45, at 304, 318. In a rather curious exchange of roles in the program patent
debate, Applied Data Research, Inc. brought suit alleging that IBM had committed
fraud on the Patent Office "by applying for and obtaining patents for computer
systems based on software but disguised as hardware." See Popper, From Hardware to Software: An Adventure Having Some Surprises, id. at 99, 120.
241. See, e.g. Jacobs, supra note 59, at 12, reprintedfrom 7 CoM. ACM at 584;
Note, supra note 114, at 901; Dixon, Patentabilityin the Computer Domain, 5 PAT.
L. ANN. 187, 188 (1967).
242. See, e.g. Note, supra note 239, at 387-88; Comment, supra note 48, at 478.
243. 409 U.S. 63, 68, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 675, 3 CLSR 256, 259 (1972).
244. See, e.g. Kates, Computer PatentDisclosures,7 COM. ACM 578, 579 (1964);
Seminar A: Patent Procurement, Session One, 4 PAT. L. ANN. 185, 197 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Session One].
245. Nimtz, supra note 45, at 131.
246. Comment, supra note 57, at 130.
247. Call, The Client'sInvention Disclosure, in PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, supra note 45, at 291, 294.
248. Brothers & Grimaldi, Comment/In re Praterand PatentReform Proposals:
"Debugging" the Patent Office's Administration of Computer ProgramApplica-
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Disclosure of flowcharts has been favored on grounds that they are
relatively concise,2 49 are familiar to examiners accustomed to similar
representations in other process technologies, 250 and better reveal the
inventive concepts than listings. 251 In fact, flowchart-only disclosure
has been defended by the argument that a listing may "obscure" the
invention, 25 2 although a more practical reason for not disclosing listings
is that to do so would facilitate infringement.
The cases have revealed disclosures ranging from equations only to
combinations of equations, flowcharts and listings. The C.C.P.A. has
not imposed categorical requirements, preferring to ask in each case
whether the disclosure adequately teaches the invention. In In re Bernhart, the Board of Appeals approved the disclosure of equations only
where implementing the program was considered obvious; 253 but mere
equations were found inadequate in In re Brown. 254 Thus, the only
generalization presently possible is that the disclosure of equations,
flowcharts and listings is acceptable and safe.
b.

Hardware Disclosure

The prevailing view has been that detailed hardware disclosure is
not required, although some believe that presentation of an alternative
analog embodiment of the algorithm might extend the claims and
"teach" the Patent Office the alleged "equivalence" of hardware and
software implementation. 2 15 That these benefits might entail excessive
obfuscation and attorney time has also been pointed out.2 6 The reported cases reveal that the C.C.P.A. will settle for generic references to
digital computers and components. Although it may be advisable to
mention a specific machine upon which the program can run, 257 there is
probably no need to do so.
tions,
(1969).
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

18 CATH. U.L. REV. 389, 407 (1969), reprinted in 51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 581, 606

Kurtz, supra note 167, at 180.
Session One, supra note 244, at 188.
Kates, supra note 244, at 579.
Jacobs, supra note 60, at B-89.
As the C.C.P.A. stated:
The board recognized that applicants' equations could be readily programmed into the computer by those skilled in programming and held that
the disclosure was therefore sufficient.
In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1398, 163 U.S.P.Q. 611,614,2 CLSR 359,363 (C.C.P.A.
1969).
254. 477 F.2d 946, 952, 177 U.S.P.Q. 691, 695-96, 4 CLSR 56, 65 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
255. Nimtz, supra note 94, at 247.
256. Kates, supra note 244, at 579.
257. The Johnston application, for example, mentioned the IBM 1400 series. See
note 380 infra and accompanying text. An IBM 7094 Data Processing System was
specifically disclosed in In re Knowlton, 481 F.2d 1357, 1367,178 U.S.P.Q. 486, 493, 4
CLSR 799, 813 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
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D.

JudicialDecisions

The preceding section presented a topically organized summary of
legal doctrines relevant to patents on program-related inventions. Such
a static presentation provides a useful overview of the issues and their
interrelationships, but it obscures the fact that legal doctrines evolve
from the judicial process. A dynamic perspective is necessary for an
understanding of judicial behavior and the policy issues raised. This
section, therefore, presents a chronological discussion of the most important program-related patent cases.
1.

In re Praterand Wei (Prater I)2"8

At the time of their invention, the spectroscopic constituent analysis of gas mixtures entailed measurements leading to a system of simultaneous equations. Prater and Wei made the mathematical discovery
that the most accurate results could be obtained by choosing for solution the subset of equations with the largest determinant. The number
of possible solution subsets was very large-184,756 subsets for a tenconstituent gas mixture. 25 9 The application disclosed, as the "preferred
embodiment" of the invention, an analog device for selecting and solvdisclosed that the invention
ing the appropriate subsets. 280 It was also261
could be practiced on a digital computer.
Both process and apparatus claims were drawn. 262 The process
claim was plainly readable upon mental, or pencil-and-paper, practice.
So was the apparatus claim, considered apart from the rest of the
specification, if a human being and his pencil-and-paper tools could be
characterized as a "system." The Patent Office attack on the application was therefore based on the "mental steps" doctrine, upon which
258. 415 F.2d 1378, 159 U.S.P.Q. 583, 2 CLSR 8 (C.C.P.A. 1968), superseded by,
PraterII, 415 F.2d 1393, 162 U.S.P.Q. 541, 2 CLSR 32 (C.C.P.A. 1969), discussed in
notes 278-89 infra and accompanying text.
259. Id. at 1379, 159 U.S.P.Q. at 585, 2 CLSR at 10.
260. Id. at 1380, 159 U.S.P.Q. at 585, 2 CLSR at 12.
261. Id. at 1385-86, 159 U.S.P.Q. at 590, 2 CLSR at 19.
262. The critical language in those claims selected as representative by the court
was:
17. The method of determining with minimum error from the spectra
of spectral analysis the concentration of the components of a mixture...
which comprises
generating physical representations of the magnitudes of the coefficients...
comparing said physical representations of the magnitudes. .. , and
generating physical representations of the concentration ....
10. In spectrographic analysis..., the system for selecting from said
functions the combination . . . which comprises means for generating a
scalar function . . . and means for determining that one of said scalar
functions ... least susceptible to error.

Id. at 1380-81, 159 U.S.P.Q. at 586, 2 CLSR at 12-13.
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was erected an edifice of objections under sections 101, 102, 103 and
112.263

Judge Smith, speaking for a unanimous court,26 4 upheld both
claims. His opinion commenced with a review of the origins and history
of the "mental steps" doctrine, which he found to be of doubtful validity.2 65 That conclusion can be considered dicta,266 however, as the proc-

ess claim was sustained on the basis of three holdings sufficient to the
outcome:
(1) "Patent protection for a process disclosed as being a sequence or combination of steps, capable of performance without human intervention and directed to an industrial technology-a 'useful art' within the intendment of the Constitution-is
not precluded by the mere fact that the process could alternatively be carried out be mental steps.

(2)

Cochrane v. Deener2

8

'267

cannot be read to require that statu-

tory processes operate only upon materials; the relevant passage 269 was dicta, spoken in the context of expanding, rather than

confining, the category of patentable subject matter; and in any
event, later Supreme Court cases
upheld claims to processes
270

acting on electical phenomena.
(3) The heart of an invention cannot be ignored when con-

sidering the questions of nonobviousness and anticipation just
because it 1may be unpatentable subject matter when viewed in
27
isolation.

The court then held that the apparatus used to carry out the method
of a valid process claim, when it is a "substantial apparatus counter272
part" of that process, is also patentable.
In sum, although the opinion did not reject the "mental steps"
doctrine outright, it destroyed its utility as a basis for attacking program-related patent applications. Because of that, the Patent Office
petitioned for a rehearing of the case. It argued that the court had
ignored both important issues and prior judicial holdings and that
under the court's holding a patent would "confer upon a patentee the
263. Id. at 1381-82, 159 U.S.P.Q. at 586-87, 2 CLSR at 14-15.
264. Chief Judge Worley concurred in the outcome but did not join in the opinion
because he had not familiarized himself adequately with the issues. Id. at 1390,159
U.S.P.Q. at 593-94, 2 CLSR at 26.
265. Id. at 1385-89, 159 U.S.P.Q. at 590-93, 2 CLSR at 17-25.
266. Dicta is defined as "opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution
or determination of the court." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 541 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
267. 415 F.2d at 1389, 159 U.S.P.Q. at 593, 2 CLSR at 25.
268. 94 U.S. 780 (1876), discussed in notes 159-70 supra and accompanying text.
269. Quoted in note 160 supra.
270. 415 F.2d at 1387-89, 159 U.S.P.Q. at 591-95, 2 CLSR at 22-25.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1389, 159 U.S.P.Q. at 593, 2 CLSR at 25.
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right to exclude others from thinking in a certain manner. 2 7 3 The
majority approved the petition without comment. 274 However, Judge
Rich, joined by Judge Almond, dissented strenuously in a blistering
criticism of the Patent Office's deportment and theories. 275 The legal
effect of the decision to grant a rehearing was to nullify the opinion in
Prater I;276 but Judge Smith's reasoning lived on, as later cases re277
vealed.
2.

In re Praterand Wei (Prater 11)278

On reargument, the Government added a new contention, namely,
that a patent on this invention would control human thought processes
and thus run afoul of the first, ninth, and tenth amendments to the
Constitution. 279 Appellants responded, in essence, by repeating Judge
Smith's subject matter discussion from his Prater I opinion. 280 The
court considered these contentions without comment.
The court characterized the "mental steps" doctrine and the decision in Cochrane in the same terms as the preceding opinion, 281 but on
this occasion these comments were merely obiter dicta,282 since the
process claims were rejected for failing to comply with section 112.283
Specifically, the court held that the process claims were readable upon
nonmachine practice, and since the appellants had admitted that they
did not intend to cover such practice, they had failed to distinctly claim
what they regarded as their invention.28 4
Upholding the apparatus claim, the court reiterated its holding in
PraterI that subject matter unpatentable in its own right could distinguish an invention from the prior art.285 In addition, it held that meansplus-function claims were to be read in light of the remainder of the
specification and that the disclosure of an analog device (and perhaps
the possibility of digital computer practice) limited the claims to ma28 8
chine implementation.
273. Id. at 1390-91, 160 U.S.P.Q. at 231-32, 2 CLSR at 27-29 (Rich, J., dissenting).
274. Id. Judge Smith, the author of the first opinion, had died shortly before the
opinion was handed down. Id.
275. Id. at 1390-93, 160 U.S.P.Q. at 231-33, 2 CLSR at 26-31 (Rich, J., dissenting).
276. 5 C.J.S., Appeal & Error§ 1446 (1958).
277. See notes 306-14 infra and accompanying text.
278. 415 F.2d 1393, 162 U.S.P.Q. 541, 2 CLSR 32 (C.C.P.A. 1969), superseding, 415

F.2d 1378, 159 U.S.P.Q. 583, 2 CLSR 8 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. at 1400 n.20, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 547 n.20, 2 CLSR at 42 n.20.
Id. at 1400-01, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 547-48, 2 CLSR at 41-43.
Id. at 1401-04, 162 U.S.P.A.at 548-50, 2 CLSR at 44-47.
See note 169 supra.
415 F.2d at 1405, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 551, 2 CLSR at 50.
Id.

285. Id.
286. Id. at 1406, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 551, 2 CLSR at 50.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1

It was also significantly stated in dicta that:
No reason is now apparent to us why, based on the Constitution,
statute, or case law, apparatus and process claims broad enough
to encompass the operation of a programmed general-purpose
digital computer are necessarily unpatentable. In one sense, a
general-purpose digital computer may be regarded as but a
storeroom of parts and/or electrical components. But once a program has been introduced, the general-purpose digital computer
becomes a special-purpose digital computer (i.e. a specific electrical circuit with or without electro-mechanical components)
which, along with the process by which it operates, may be patented subject, of course, to the requirements of novelty, utility,
and nonobviousness. Based on the present law, we see no other
287
reasonable conclusion.
The broad sweep of that dicta was the primary reason that Judge
Worley wrote a concurring opinion, rather than joining the majority:
It is questionable whether prior decisions denying patentability of purely mental steps, or the statute, read singly or together, can support a broad rule either sanctioning or prohibiting the patentability of such steps in relation to computer programs. Where the line will be drawn can only be determined on a
288
case by case basis ....
Judge Worley also took the occasion to deplore the possibility that
Congress might modify the patent system "that has worked so well."28' 9
290

3. In re Bernhart

Bernhart and Fetter invented a way to portray an image of a threedimensional object on a two-dimensional surface from any spatial perspective. A set of transformation equations constituted much of the
novelty and were disclosed along with a digital computer and plotting
machine. No software appeared in the specifications.
The Patent Office examiner had attacked the failure to provide
actual programs as insufficient disclosure under section 112,291 but was
reversed by the Patent Office Board of Appeals, which found the programming obvious given the equations. 29 2 One apparatus claim was
drawn in broad terms but was rejected by the Board on the basis of
prior art citations by the Patent Office.293 The remaining process and
apparatus claims were limited by such language as "programming the
computer" and "electronic digital computer means."
287. Id. at 1403 n.29, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 549-50 n.29, 2 CLSR at 47 n.29 (emphasis in
original).
288. Id. at 1406, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 552, 2 CLSR at 51-52 (Worley, J., concurring).
289. Id. at 1407, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 552, 2 CLSR at 52 (Worley, J., concurring).
290. 417 F.2d 1395, 163 U.S.P.Q. 611, 2 CLSR 359 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
291. Id. at 1398, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 614, 2 CLSR at 363.
292. Id.
293. Id.
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The Government again urged its subject matter objections on the
C.C.P.A. It also offered two novel objections to the apparatus claim: (a)
that programming did not constitute the requisite structural difference
over the prior art; and (b) that the "printed matter" cases blocked
patents on nonstatutory subject matter by "indirection. 2 9 4 The court
rejected all objections and upheld both the process and apparatus
claims. It again avoided direct rejection of the "mental steps" doctrine,2 95 holding instead that the requirements of both a "digital computer" and "planar plotting apparatus" in the claim were sufficient to
296
limit the process to machine practice.
In answer to the contention, that since the equations themselves are
nonstatutory the whole invention is nonstatutory, the court conceded
that Congress had intended to exclude mathematical equations from
"monopolization by patent ' 297 but stated that:
To allow the claims in issue here would not prohibit all.uses of
those equations ....
[A] member of the public would have to do
much more than use the equations to infringe any of these
claims. He would have
to use them in the physical equipment
298
recited in the claim.
The structural difference objection occasioned the formulation of
an important characterization:
If a machine is programmed in a certain new and unobvious way,
it is physically different from the machine without that program;
its memory elements are differently arranged ....
If a new
machine has not been invented, certainly a 'new and useful improvement' of the unprogrammed machine has been .... 299
4.

In re Mahony

300

Mahony was the first case to consider claims to a process beginning
and ending within a digital computer. The applicant claimed a new
method of identifying framing bits in a "receiver of digital information,
such as a digital computer" and disclosed digital circuitry in block
3 °1
diagram form as well as an algorithm.
The "mental steps" doctrine again constituted the basis of the
Patent Office's rejections; and the examiner demonstrated to the court
that the algorithm could be practiced by pencil and paper. 0 2 The court
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
421
Id.
Id.

at 1398, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 614-15, 2 CLSR at 363-64.
at 1400, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 616, 2 CLSR at 366.
at 1401, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 617, 2 CLSR at 364-68.
at 1399, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 616, 2 CLSR at 365.
at 1399, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 616, 2 CLSR at 365.
at 1400, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 616, 2 CLSR at 366.
F.2d 742, 164 U.S.P.Q. 572, 2 CLSR 587 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
at 743-44, 164 U.S.P.Q. at 573-74, 2 CLSR at 587-89.
at 744, 164 U.S.P.Q. at 574, 2 CLSR at 589-90.
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again declined to address the "mental steps" issue and reaffirmed its
intention to confine the relevance of mental practice to section 112
scrutiny. 30 3 The claims were sustained when the court found the recital
of "bits" and "bit stream" sufficient to limit the claims to machine
practice.30 4 The examiner was found to be operating not on a bit stream
but on a "character representation" of a bit stream when following the
3
algorithm by hand. 1
5.

30 6

In re Musgrave

Musgrave's invention was directed to a method of delineating
geological subsurface formations by taking a series of seismograms
from geographically separated stations. Musgrave's primary discovery
was that the delination could be improved by applying a hyperbolic
function to the family of seismograms produced by a particular arrangement of stations. The possibility that a digital computer could be
30 7
used to accomplish the corrections was disclosed.
All of the claims were drawn to methods and contained some steps
not limited by machine-oriented language. 308 This provided the Patent
Office with an opportunity to force consideration of its "mental steps"
theories. It also provided Judge Rich, the author of the opinion, an
opportunity to reinstate much of Judge Smith's PraterI opinion." 9
The argument that statutory process steps had to "operate physically upon substances" 310 was again rejected, at least where accompanied by other steps so limited.3 11 Judge Rich examined the "mental
steps" doctrine and said, "[t]hat law we, like others, have found to be
something of a morass. '"312 Resort to the "Abrams non-rules" was
characterized as "legal error. ' 313 Judge Rich summarized his findings in
a sweeping statement of the law on statutory subject matter:
All that is necessary, in our view, to make a sequence of operational steps a statutory "process" within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it
be in the technological arts so as to be in consonance with the
Constitutional purpose to promote the progress of "useful
314
arts.'
303. Id. at 745, 164 U.S.P.Q. at 575, 2 CLSR at 591-92.
304. Id. at 746-47, 164 U.S.P.Q. at 575-76, 2 CLSR at 592.
305. Id.
306. 431 F.2d 882, 167 U.S.P.Q. 280, 2 CLSR 920 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
307. Id. at 887, 167 U.S.P.Q. at 284-85, 2 CLSR at 928.
308. Id. at 888, 167 U.S.P.Q. at 285, 2 CLSR at 930.
309. 415 F.2d 1378, 160 U.S.P.Q. 230, 2 CLSR 8 (C.C.P.A. 1968), superseded by,
415 F.2d 1393, 162 U.S.P.Q. 541, 2 CLSR 32 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
310. See notes 159-70 supra and accompanying text.
311. 431 F.2d at 892-93, 167 U.S.P.Q. at 289, 2 CLSR at 936-37.
312. Id. at 890, 167 U.S.P.Q. at 287, 2 CLSR at 933.

313. Id. at 892, 167 U.S.P.Q. at 289, 2 CLSR at 937.
314. Id. at 893, 167 U.S.P.Q. at 289-90, 2 CLSR at 938.
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Judge Baldwin concurred in the outcome but objected to the majority's "major and radical shift in this area of the law" 315 and to their
"serious breach with the time-honored judicial practice of resolving
important questions of law on a case-by-case basis."31 He felt that the
majority had overreacted to "this 'fearful' mental steps doctrine" 317 and
expressed concern that the new "technological arts" standard would
merely substitute one set of uncertainties for another. 318
For all intents and purposes, the court had come full circle since
PraterI. It was not surprising that Judge Rich would reach this position
in view of his reaction to a rehearing of that case;319 but the fact that
three other judges joined with him in the Musgrave opinion was an
important indication of the court's growing impatience with Patent
320
Office subject matter objections to program-related patents.
6.

3 21

In re Foster

The discovery presented was a mathematical method for correcting
distortion in seismograms, and a digital computer was disclosed as a
possible mode of practice. The Patent Office again presented section
101 objections, which the court felt had been answered in Musgrave
and Mahony.322 One process claim was limited only by the word "signals" and was consequently rejected under Prater11's section 112 "intention" test.3 23 By contrast, "electrical signals" was held to limit a
324
companion claim to machine practice.
7.

32
In re Benson 1

Benson and Tabbot invented a new way to convert data from
binary coded decimal to pure binary form in a digital computer. The
315. Id. at 893-94, 167 U.S.P.Q. at 290, 2 CLSR at 938-39 (Baldwin, J., concurring).

316. Id.
317. Id. at 895, 167 U.S.P.Q. at 291, 2 CLSR at 940 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
318. Id. at 896, 167 U.S.P.Q. at 291-92, 2 CLSR at 942 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
319. 415 F.2d 1378, 1390, 160 U.S.P.Q. 230,231, 2 CLSR 8,26 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (Rich,
J., dissenting).
320. Caution is necessary in analyzing Patent Office behavior because of the
time lag between the development of rejections by the examiners and the Board of
Appeals and the hearing of the resulting case by the C.C.P.A. For example, the
Patent Office theories considered in In re Bernhart had originally been made
before the PraterII decision was handed down. Nevertheless, the oral arguments
of the Solicitor General and the failure of the Government to abandon objections
before the hearing can be seen as an implied restatement of the theories originally
supporting the rejections.
321. 438 F.2d 1011, 169 U.S.P.Q. 99, 2 CLSR 994 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
322. Id. at 1014, 169 U.S.P.Q. at 100, 2 CLSR at 998.
323. Id. at 1015-16, 169 U.S.P.Q. at 101-02, 2 CLSR at 1000-01.
324. Id. at 1016, 169 U.S.P.Q. at 102, 2 CLSR at 1001.
325. 441 F.2d 682, 169 U.S.P.Q. 548, 2 CLSR 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub nom.
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972).
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specification disclosed a program listing and provided a block diagram
32
description of a computer. Two method claims were at issue.
Once again, the Patent Office raised subject matter objections to
the claims, and once again Judge Rich rejected them. 327 The claim 8
rejection was rather easily disposed of by finding that the words "reentrant shift register," "storing," "shifting," and "masking" confined the
claim to processes inside a computer. 32 8 The Patent Office had apparently become desperate in its objections to such closely limited claims,
as the opinion reveals:
The solicitor would have us hold the method is not a "process"
within section 101 on the ground that a programmable computer
is merely a "tool of the mind" and the method is basically "mental" in character, apparently because the "workstuff" of the
method is numbers which are mathematical abstractions. As the
Patent Office would say, we do not find the argument persua329
sive.
Claim 13 could not be disposed of as easily, since it was readable
326. 8. The method of converting signals from binary coded aecimal form
into binary which comprises the steps of
(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in a reentrant shift register,
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until there is a
binary "1" in the second position of said register,
(3) masking out said binary "l" in said second position of said register,
(4) adding a binary "1" to the first position of said register,
(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions,
(6) adding a "l" to said first position, and
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in preparation for a succeeding binary "1"in the second position of said register.
13. A data processing method for converting binary coded decimal
number representations into binary number representations comprising
the steps of
(1) testing each binary digit position beginning with the least significant
binary digit position, of the most significant decimal digit representation for a binary "0" or a binary "l";
(2) if a binary "0" is detected, repeating step (1) for the next least significant binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representation;
(3) if a binary "l" is detected, adding a binary "l" at the (i + l)th and (i +
3)th least significant binary digit positions of the next lesser significant decimal digit representation, and repeating step (1) for the next
least significant binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representation;
(4) upon exhausting the binary digit positions of said most significant
decimal digit representation, repeating steps (1) through (3) for the
lext lesser significant decimal representation as modified by the
previous execution of steps (1) through (3); and
(5) repeating steps (1) through (4) until the second least significant decimal digit representation has been so processed.
Id. at 683-84, 169 U.S.P.Q. at 549, 2 CLSR at 1032-33.
327. Id. at 684-88, 169 U.S.P.Q. at 549-53, 2 CLSR at 1033-41.
328. Id. at 687, 169 U.S.P.Q. at 552, 2 CLSR at 1038-39.
329. Id.
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upon nonmachine practice. The court observed that it was improbable
that anyone would want to practice the method by hand and that
mental practice would not in any case require the exercise of judgment
or even the making of a decision: "Realistically, the process of claim 13
has no practical use other than the more effective operation and utilization of a machine known as a digital computer."330 Computers, as
machines, were held to be "in the technological field. . . regardless of
the uses to which their users put them, '331 and therefore, processes
confined in practical use to "internal computer operations" were also
3 32
"technological.
Well before Benson, it must have been clear to the Patent Office
that its position on program patents was doomed in the C.C.P.A. However, Benson provided the Patent Office an especially suitable opportunity for a petition to the Supreme Court: the entire invention was
contained in an algorithm, no field of use limitations existed, permanent changes in substances were absent, and at least one of the claims
was readable on human thought processes. Therefore, a petition for
certiori was filed and granted,3 33 setting the stage for the Supreme
Court's first pronouncement on the subject of program-related patents.

3 34

8.

33 5

In re McIlroy

McIlroy claimed a method for retrieving symbolic data from a
stored string, and at least one of the process claims was readable upon
human practice. 336 The Patent Office again asserted section 101 objections, but the patience of the court had apparently run out. In an
opinion occupying little more than one-half page, the court, in effect,
sent the Patent Office back to read the opinions in Musgrave and
Benson and stated that "machine implementation vs. mental implementation is not a determinative dichotomy in deciding whether a
method is statutory under 35 U.S.C. 101.' 3 1 In retrospect, the delivery
of that bald statement may have been a serious tactical error, since
Benson 338 was soon to go before Supreme Court justices who were
particularly sensitive to perceived trammels on thought.
330. Id. at 688, 169 U.S.P.Q. at 553, 2 CLSR at 1041 (emphasis in original).
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. 405 U.S. 915 (1972).
334. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972),
discussed in notes 343-52 infra and accompanying text.
335. 442 F.2d 1397, 170 U.S.P.Q. 31, 3 CLSR 81 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
336. Id. at 1398, 170 U.S.P.Q. at 31, 3 CLSR at 82.
337. Id. at 1398, 170 U.S.P.Q. at 31, 3 CLSR at 83.
338. See notes 343-52 infra and accompanying text.
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339

The invention was a method of analyzing data words to determine
the number of binary l's they contained. The claims were limited by
such language as "data processor" and "register."" Patent Office objections based on sections 100(b) and 101 were overruled. The principle
point of interest was the C.C.P.A.'s elaboration of the Musgrave "technological arts" test: "The phrase 'technological arts,' as we have used it,
is synonymous with the phrase 'useful arts' as it appears in Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution. ' '341 Judge Rich filed a concurring opinion,
apparently only for the purpose of refining the majority's statement.34 2
10.

Gottschalk v. Benson

43

The sole question certified to the Supreme Court in Benson was
whether the Benson and Tabbot method was a statutory process. 344 The
numerous briefs filed by the parties and various amici curiae 45 explored most of the subject matter issues that had been raised both in
and out of court and asserted a variety of policy arguments. The case
was heard by six justices3 46 who unanimously joined in Justice Douglas'
opinion, finding the claimed processes to be nonstatutory subject
matter.
The opinion has occasioned a large volume of commentary, primarily because the scope of the holding is far from clear.3 47 It is nevertheless
339. 457 F.2d 997, 173 U.S.P.Q. 430, 3 CLSR 173 (C.C.P.A. 1972).

340. Id. at 1000, 173 U.S.P.Q. at 432, 3 CLSR at 176.
341. Id. at 1003, 173 U.S.P.Q. at 434, 3 CLSR at 182.
342. The phrase "useful arts" which was written into the Constitution
conjures up images of the Franklin stove, horse collars, and buggy whips.
The term "technological arts" was selected in Musgrave as probably having a connotation in these times roughly equivalent to that which "useful
arts" had in the eighteenth century. No new legal concept was intended
....
Now we have come full circle in pointing out that the intention all
along has been to convey the same idea and to occupy whatever ground the
Constitution permits with respect to the categories of patentable subject
matter named in section 101.
Id. at 1003-04, 173 U.S.P.Q. at 435, 3 CLSR at 182 (Rich, J., concurring).
343. 409 U.S. 63,175 U.S.P.Q. 673,3 CLSR 256 (1972), rev'g sub nom. In re Benson,
441 F.2d 682, 169 U.S.P.Q. 548, 2 CLSR 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
344. Id. at 64, 175 U.S.P.Q. at 674, 3 CLSR at 257.
345. See notes 49, 50 & 54 supra and accompanying text.
346. Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell abstained for unstated reasons.
347. See, e.g. Bigelow, Infosystems, the Law and Patents, 13 JURIMETRICS J. 129
(1973); Jacobs, Patentsfor Software Inventions-The Supreme Court's Decision,
id. at 132; Duggan, Patents on Programs?The Supreme Court Says No, id. at 135;
Freed, Protection of ProprietaryProgramsin Light of Benson and Tabbot, id. at
139; Note, Patentabilityof Computer Programs, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 494 (1973);
Comment, Patent Law-ComputerProgramsfor ProcessingData With a Digital
Computer Cannot be Patented UnderPresent UnitedStates Laws, 4 LoY. Cm. L.J.
560 (1973); Note, Computer Software: Beyond the Limits of Existing Proprietary
ProtectionPolicy, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 116 (1973); Are Computer ProgramsEver
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possible to identify the minimum holding to which the opinion can be
confined. It emerges from a consideration of the Benson and Tabbot
application in conjunction with the following statement of the Supreme
Court's conclusions:
***What we come down to in a nutshell is the following:
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in practical effect that would be the result if the formula for converting
BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in this
case. The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial
practical application except in connection with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the
patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula 3and
in
48
practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.
At a minimum, therefore, Benson stands for the proposition that
processes which are (a) defined by an algorithm with no practical use
except in the programmed manipulation of signals in a digital computer, and (b) not limited by further claim language confining the claim
to a subset of possible applications, are nonstatutory subject matter.
It is also clear that the Court's reasoning would have applied
squarely to an apparatus claim to a digital computer programmed to
practice the algorithm had such a claim been presented. However,
apparatus claims were not present and were therefore not covered by
the holding, narrowly construed.
Several other features of the case are of interest:
(1) The opinion discussed Cochranev. Deener349 at length and
stated that "transformation and reduction of an article 'to
a different state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of
a process claim that does not include particular machines."3 5 The thrust of this observation was turned aside,
however, when the Court later stated: "[w]e do not hold
that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet
the requirements of our prior precedents. 3 51 It is clear in
any case that Justice Douglas did not consider the
Cochrane test satisfied by state changes in computer
components, perhaps because of their ephemerality. Also
important was the characterization of Cochrane as "prec-

edent. "352
(2)

Justice Douglas was plainly preoccupied with programs in
general.

Patentable?Did the Patent Office Win?, 124 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), at
C-1 (Apr. 19, 1973).
348. 409 U.S. at 71-72, 175 U.S.P.Q. at 676, 3 CLSR at 262.
349. 94 U.S. 780 (1876).
350. 409 U.S. at 70, 175 U.S.P.Q. at 676, 3 CLSR at 261.

351. Id. at 71, 175 U.S.P.Q. at 676, 3 CLSR at 262.
352. Id.
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(3)

The outcome turned on potential economic control of an
"idea." 353 It is therefore rather surprising that Justice Douglas, who has been especially preoccupied with first amendment issues, found the subject matter limitation in the intent
54
of Congress rather than in the Constitution.

(4)

The generally confusing language of the opinion and particularly the sudden qualifications of categorical statements
of doctrine, are persuasive evidence that the remaining
members of the court were unwilling to go much beyond the
fact pattern of the case. The absence of concurring opinions
under such circumstances suggests that the others either
considered the issue unimportant or forbiddingly complex.
Therefore, Benson may not be reliable guide to future Supreme Court behavior in program-related patent cases.

11.

In re Brown

5

Brown involved the invention of an all-weather terrestrial navigation system. The applicant disclosed the invention in general block
diagrams and furnished mathematical equations. It was also disclosed
that an operating "mathematical model" had been constructed, but no
programs were provided. 356 Instead, the applicant furnished affidavits
asserting that a program had been prepared and that its preparation,
given the disclosure, was within the skill level of general practitioners
35 7
at the time of filing.
The question in the case was the adequacy of the disclosure to teach
the invention.358 The court held that a "mathematical model" was not
adequate to teach the actual invention. Of more interest, however, was
the holding that the affidavits inadequately demonstrated that the
specification could teach the program behind the "mathematical model." 3 9 They were held to lack sufficient factual content and were unreliable evidence of the skill level of general practitioners because the
affiants had discussed the invention at length with the applicant before
programming the invention. 36 0 By disposing of the case on these
grounds, the court effectively declined to require actual program disclosure.
353. Id.
354. If these programs are to be patentable, considerable problems are
raised which only committees of Congress can manage, for broad powers
of investigation are needed, including hearings which canvass the wide
variety of views which those operating in this field entertain. The technological problems tendered in the many briefs before use indicate to us
that considered action by the Congress is needed.
Id.at 73, 175 U.S.P.Q. at 677, 3 CLSR at 263 (footnote omitted).
355. 477 F.2d 946, 177 U.S.P.Q. 691, 4 CLSR 56 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
356. Id.at 950, 177 U.S.P.Q. at 694, 4 CLSR at 62.
357. Id.
358. Id.at 951, 177 U.S.P.Q. at 694, 4 CLSR at 63.
359. Id.at 951, 177 U.S.P.Q. at 695, 4 CLSR at 64.
360. Id.at 951-52, 177 U.S.P.Q. at 695, 4 CLSR at 64. See also note 234 supra.
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12.

61
In re Christensen

The invention related to a method of determining the porosity of
subsurface geological formations and centered on a mathematical technique for processing the results of physical measurements. Exercise of
the mathematical technique constituted the last step in process claims
otherwise limited to physical measuring operations. No machine implementation of the mathematical formula was disclosed." 2
Despite the absence of specific references to programming implementation, the case reveals the demoralizing effect that the decision
in Gottschalk v. Benson had on the C.C.P.A. The majority expressed its
rejection of the Christensen claims in the following holding:
Is a method claim in which the point of novelty is a mathematical equation to be solved as the final step of the method, a
statutory method? We follow the Supreme Court in concluding
363
that the answer is in the negative.
But that was an unnecessarily broad reading of the Benson opinion, which had stressed the fact that the applicant's claims were "so
abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the
BCD to pure binary conversion." 364 The Christensen claims, on the
other hand, were limited to the use of the formula in a porosity-determining process and thus could not "preempt" unknown uses of the
formula."' This was to be the broadest reading of Benson by the
C.C.P.A.
Judge Rich, who had authored the first Benson opinion, 366 upholding Claim 13 on the very basis on which it was rejected by the Supreme
Court, "reluctantly" concurred in the Christensen outcome: "I have no
more doubt it is a 'process' within the meaning of § 101 than I had about
3 67
Benson's process; but on that point I seem to have been reversed.
Although he disagreed with its relevance to section 101, he clearly
recognized that the Supreme Court's decision turned on its perception
368
of the "scope" and "breadth" of the Benson process claims.
13.

In re Knowlton

69

Knowlton invented a method for digital computer processing of
361. 478 F.2d 1392, 178 U.S.P.Q. 35, 4 CLSR 66 (C.C.P.A. 1973).

362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

Id. at 1392-93, 178 U.S.P.Q. at 36-37, 4 CLSR at 66-68.
Id. at 1394, 178 U.S.P.Q. at 37, 4 CLSR at 70.
409 U.S. at 69, 175 U.S.P.Q. at 675, 3 CLSR at 259.
478 F.2d at 1392-93, 178 U.S.P.Q. at 37-38, 4 CLSR at 66-68.
441 F.2d 682, 169 U.S.P.Q. 548, 2 CLSR 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub nom.

Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972).
367. 478 F.2d at 1396, 178 U.S.P.Q. at 39, 4 CLSR at 73 (Rich, J., concurring).
368. Id. at 1395-96, 178 U.S.P.Q. at 38-39, 4 CLSR at 71-73 (Rich, J., concurring).
369. 481 F.2d 1357, 178 U.S.P.Q. 486, 4 CLSR 799 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
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linked-list files with variable-length records, and claimed it as a "machine" in means-plus-function language. The specification disclosed
37
block diagrams and program listings.
The Government's position was based solely on citations of prior
art and section 112 objections, the Board of Appeals having reversed
subject matter objections by the examiner, perhaps on the strength of
earlier C.C.P.A. cases.3 71 The C.C.P.A. rejected the "multiple recitation"
attack on the claim language. 372 An effort by the Government to burden
program-related apparatus claims with heavy disclosure requirements
373
also suffered defeat.
The Board of Appeals had acted on the Knowlton case before the
decision in Gottschalk v. Benson. The Patent Office thereby lost an
excellent opportunity to extend the Benson holding to apparatus
claims, since the essential facts in Knowlton seem to fall squarely
within the Supreme Court's reasoning.
374

14. In re Brandstader

The invention was an apparatus which permitted subscribers of a
store-and-forward communications system to retrieve messages from
dedicated files. An "alternative" embodiment suggested the replacement of one of the apparatus units disclosed in block diagrams with
"stored program routines employed in conjunction with . . . common
control unit 30. ''11 s No listings or flowcharts were provided.3 76
The court upheld the Patent Office rejections based on section 112
because the applicant had refused to provide the Patent Office either an
appraisal of the effort required to produce the program or a "bare bones
flowchart. 3 77 Under these circumstances, the Patent Office could reasonably conclude that the average person skilled in the art might be put
to "unreasonable experimentation and delays" in coming into posses378
sion of the apparatus to carry out the invention.
15. In re Johnston

79

The invention was a computer-implemented, automated, financial
accounting system, which periodically processed a transaction file
370. Id. at 1358-61, 178 U.S.P.Q. at 487-89, 4 CLSR at 801-04.
371. Id. at 1361-65, 178 U.S.P.Q. at 489-92, 4 CLSR at 805-10.
372. Id. at 1367-68, 178 U.S.P.Q. at 493-94, 4 CLSR at 813-16.
373. Id. at 1367, 178 U.S.P.Q. at 494, 4 CLSR at 814.
374. 484 F.2d 1395, 179 U.S.P.Q. 286, 4 CLSR 976 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
375. Id. at 1399, 179 U.S.P.Q. at 288, 4 CLSR at 980.
376. Id. at 1403, 179 U.S.P.Q. at 292, 4 CLSR at 988.
377. Id. at 1407, 179 U.S.P.Q. at 295, 4 CLSR at 994.
378. Id.
379. 502 F.2d 765, 183 U.S.P.Q. 172, 4 CLSR 1491 (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev'd sub nom.
Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 189 U.S.P.Q. 257, 5 CLSR 1133 (1976).
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against individually tailored subfiles. Disclosure was by block diagram
and full program listing; and an IBM 1400 series computer was mentioned as a possible element in the system.38 ° One mode of practice
mentioned was in the maintenance of bank customer records. The representative apparatus claim read in part:
20. A record-keeping machine system for financial accounts,
said system comprising a data processor including a memory ....
a processor for combining and comparing the
coded signals... ; input and output devices; and a control
system... ; said memory including a storage file of a plurality of machine-readable records formed of coded
combinatorial signals .. .; said control system including
means for directing the processing of said files . . .; and
means for producing an output record...381
The Board of Appeals, speaking before the decision in Benson,
rejected the claims under sections 101, 103 and 112.382 The subject
matter rejection was made on the ground that the claims failed the
Musgrave "technological arts" test 3 83 because they sought a "monopoly" on banking activities.3 84 The invention was said to be an obvious
variation of either normal bookkeeping practices or of another patent.385 The section 112 rejection was made on the basis that the claims
were distinguished from prior art only by nonmachine factors, such as
38
account identification and financial relationships.
The C.C.P.A. refused to sustain the section 112 rejection, saying
that the fact that the claims read only on machines was completely
dispositive.3 87 Similarly, the section 101 challenge was rejected with the
statement that "machine systems" were always within the "technolog' 388
ical arts.
The Patent Office solicitor had argued that Benson controlled the
case, but the court said:
As we stated in In re Christensen...: "The issue considered by
the Supreme Court in Benson was a narrow one, namely, is a
formula for converting binary coded decimal numerals into pure
binary numerals by a series of mathematical calculations a patentable process? (emphasis added)." Furthermore, the instant
claims, in apparatusform, do not claim or encompass a law of
389
nature, a mathematical formula, or an algorithm.
380. Id. at 765-67, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 173-74, 4 CLSR at 1492-94.

381. Id. at 767, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 174, 4 CLSR at 1494-95.
382. Id. at 768, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 174-75, 4 CLSR at 1496.
383. Id. at 769, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 175, 4 CLSR at 1498.
384. Id.

385. Id. at 769, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 175, 4 CLSR at 1499.
386. Id. at 768, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 175, 4 CLSR at 1497.
387. Id. at 770, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 176, 4 CLSR at 1500-01.
388. Id. at 771, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 176, 4 CLSR at 1501.
389. Id. at 771, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 177, 4 CLSR at 1502.
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The section 103 rejection was disposed of by reference to several
differences between the Johnston invention and the prior art.390
For the first time in the history of program-related patents, there
39 1
were two dissents to the majority opinion. One was by Judge Markey,
who found the majority's approach to the section 103 question more
appropriate to a section 102 anticipation inquiry. In his view, the
claimed invention was an obvious modification of existing art.
More fundamental was the dissent of Judge Rich,392 who felt that
Benson controlled the case. Judge Rich rejected the machine-process
distinctions:
I am quite familiar with the legal doctrine that a new program
makes an old general purpose digital computer into a new and
different machine. This court has been through that many times
and I am not denying the validity of this principle-which partakes of the nature of a legal fiction when it comes to drafting
claims. My problem is that knowing the invention to be a new
program, I must decide whether it is patentable in any claimed
form in view of Benson .... 393
Although confessing confusion as to the meaning of Benson's wording,
Judge Rich felt that the spirit of that case denied coverage to programs,
however claimed;3 94 and he could find "no realistic distinction" between the instant invention and that in Benson. 395 Finally, he invited a
396
new consideration of the program patent issue by the Supreme Court.
The Patent Office apparently felt that the case was strong and
3 97
petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, which was granted.
E.

Summary

One potential cause of legal issue mortality is a court decision.
When a court is forced, or chooses, to confront squarely and resolve an
issue, the question is settled, at least for a time within that court's
jurisdiction. As revealed above,3 9 8 however, it is not always easy to
identify the precise issues addressed by a court or to draw a line
between holdings and dicta. Moreover, the same issue settled in one
390. Id. at 771-72, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 177, 4 CLSR at 1502-03.
391. Id. at 772, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 177, 4 CLSR at 1503 (Markey, J., dissenting).
392. Id. at 772-73, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 178, 4 CLSR at 1504 (Rich, J., dissenting).
393. Id. at 773, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 178-79, 4 CLSR at 1506 (Rich, J., dissenting).
394. Id.
395. Id. at 774, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 179, 4 CLSR at 1507 (Rich, J., dissenting).
396. Id. at 774, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 179, 4 CLSR at 1508 (Rich, J., dissenting).
397. Dann v. Johnston, 421 U.S. 962 (1975). [Ed. Note: This article was completed
prior to the Supreme Court decision in Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219,189 U.S.P.Q.
257, 5 CLSR 1133 (1976). For a discussion of that case and subsequent programrelated patent decisions, see the Roberts article and the Case Digest summaries in
this issue.]
398. See notes 258-397 supra and accompanying text.
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court may resurface in another jurisdiction.39 9 In the program patent
context, all of the judicial decisions, except two, have been delivered by
the C.C.P.A. 40 0 That court's doctrines do not bind the multitude of
United States district courts, which may re-open the issues during
infringement contests. 40 1 Neither are decisions of the C.C.P.A. binding
on other appellate courts, although there, as well as in the district
courts, the court's reasoning may be found persuasive.0 2 Certainly the
demise of an issue cannot be inferred from the apparent acquiescence of
the Patent Office in a decision, since the Patent Office may simply be
waiting for a case with particularly favorable features for a petition to
the Supreme Court (as in Benson and Johnston). Finally, some issues
enter a state of "suspended animation" as the focus of the debate shifts
elsewhere.
The important issue of patent coverage of software has received no
concrete judicial treatment. Therefore, it is unclear what phenomena
will eventually be held to infringe patents on computer-related inventions.40 3 The questions raised by patents on programs claimed as such
have likewise received no direct judicial consideration, but they are still
of interest because of possible future congressional action phrased in
"program" terms. It is likely that Justice Douglas would have rejected a
direct claim to a program had the question been presented in Benson. If
it were expected to achieve broad coverage, a claim to a program per
se
40 4
would probably run afoul of Justice Douglas' "nutshell" passage.
The C.C.P.A. has been the sole source of program-related law on
sections 102, 103 and 112. Anticipation theories under section 102,
peculiar to programs, have been rejected by that court and are unlikely
to reemerge. 40 5 Section 103, however, has received little treatment except for that arising from the Patent Office's assertion of section 103
objections based on the "mental steps" doctrine. 40 1 Of course, the application of the nonobviousness test is ultimately a matter of judgment in
each case, but there are no indications yet of the scope of such general
terms as "prior art" in a program context. Apart from the rescue of
399. 1B MOORE'S

FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.402[1] (2d ed. 1974).
400. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 189 U.S.P.Q. 257, 5 CLSR 1133 (1976), rev'g
sub nom. In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 183 U.S.P.Q. 172, 4 CLSR 1491 (C.C.P.A.
1974); and Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972),
rev'g sub nom. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 169 U.S.P.Q. 548, 2 CLSR 1030 (C.C.P.A.
1971).
401. See note 399 supra.
402. Id.
403. In Digitronics Corp. v. New York State Racing Ass'n, 187 U.S.P.Q. 602
(E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1977), the court held that a general
purpose computer programmed to do what a patented machine does, does not
infringe the machine patent. Id. at 640.
404. See text accompanying note 348 supra.
405. See notes 192-202 supra and accompanying text.
406. See notes 207-12 supra and accompanying text.
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means-plus-function claims from the multiple recitation theory, the
frequent consideration of section 112 has produced only a set of specific
47
indicators of adequate claim language and disclosure.
The center of action in program-related patent litigation has been
section 101. By the time of Benson, the C.C.P.A. had removed all
significant section 101 obstacles to program-related patents, whether
claimed as processes or as apparatus. The "mental steps" doctrine had
been effectively eliminated," 8 and the "acting on materials"'40 9 and
"function of a machine" 410 arguments had been rejected. The court had
made it quite clear that loosely constructed claims would receive only
section 112 scrutiny.
Gottschalk v. Benson produced a substantial perturbation in the
law of statutory subject matter, the dimensions and durability of which
remain uncertain. Benson clearly did not touch upon the "mental
steps" doctrine, but it cannot be inferred that this silence represented a
willingness to tolerate a claim that does read upon practical mental
implementation. As Judge Rich observed in In re Christensen, the
thrust of Benson was to read scope limitations into at least the process
category of statutory subject matter. 411 However, contrary to Judge
Rich's section 101 preferences, the Supreme Court has been reading
such limitations into the subject matter category throughout the history
of the patent system. The "acting on materials" cases, for example, were
fundamentally concerned with scope, 412 as were the "function of a
machine" opinions. 413 The fact that previous concerns for breadth were
cast in language that turned out to be unsatisfactory does not obviate
this concern. And Benson at least made the "doctrine" of Cochrane
41 5
respectable again,414 following its eclipse in Musgrave.
It should also be noted that the majority opinion in In re Johnston41 6 is inconsistent with Benson in several respects. Johnston quoted
407. See notes 213-57 supra and accompanying text.
408. PraterII, 415 F.2d at 1401-04, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 548-50, 2 CLSR at 44-47; In re
Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 892, 167 U.S.P.Q. 280, 288-89, 2 CLSR 920, 937 (C.C.P.A.
1970).
409. PraterII, 415 F.2d at 1402-03, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 549, 2 CLSR at 46.
410. In re Tarczy-Hornoch, 397 F.2d 856, 866, 158 U.S.P.Q. 141, 149 (C.C.P.A.
1968).
411. 478 F.2d 1392, 1395, 178 U.S.P.Q. 35, 38, 4 CLSR 66, 71 (C.C.P.A. 1973)(Rich,
J., concurring). This presentation of Christensen's interpretation of Benson is
accurate only insofar as the operative word is "process." The C.C.P.A. in Christensen plainly saw Benson as reaching beyond "a formula for converting binary
coded decimal numerals." Id. at 1394, 178 U.S.P.Q. at 37, 4 CLSR at 69.
412. See note 409 supra.
413. See note 410 supra.
414. See notes 349-52 supra and accompanying text.
415. 431 F.2d at 893, 167 U.S.P.Q. at 289, 2 CLSR at 937. See also text accompanying notes 310-11 supra.
416. 502 F.2d 765, 183 U.S.P.Q. 172, 4 CLSR 1491 (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev'd sub nom.
Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 189 U.S.P.Q. 257, 5 CLSR 1133 (1976).
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Waldbaum 1417 for the proposition that the "technological arts" define
statutory subject matter,418 but Benson clearly overruled that position.419 Johnston's confinement of the Benson holding to its narrowest
facts is also unsupportable in the face of even the most conservative
reading of the "nutshell" section of the Benson opinion. 42 0 Finally, as
Judge Rich pointed out, claims in apparatus form to the Benson and
Tabbot invention would have been interchangeable in effect with the
process claims actually presented.4 2'

III. THE POLICY DEBATE
The preceding section focused largely on the doctrinal aspects of
the program patent issue. Yet, the parties to the debate have not
confined themselves to legal argument. Broader policy considerations
have frequently been urged in both the secondary literature and the
courts. This section collects these scattered policy contentions and presents them according to their contribution to two fundamental issues:
(a) whether patent protection for programs should be available; and (b)
who should decide that question.
A.

Desirabilityof Patent Protection

Patent proponents typically base their policy arguments upon the
purported economic purposes of the patent system and the need for
patent support in the software sector. 422 The major economic goals said
to be served by program patents are the stimulation of investment in
software innovation and the disclosure of innovation with a consequent
contribution to other innovation and avoidance of wasteful duplication.423 Program patents have, in addition, been held out as a stimulant
processing industry as well as an aid to
to competition in the entire data
"orderly" software markets. 42 4 Needless to say, patent opponents have
425
controverted these arguments at every turn.
Most economic arguments in favor of patents commence with a
417. 457 F.2d 997, 173 U.S.P.Q. 430, 3 CLSR 173 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
418. 502 F.2d at 771, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 176, 4 CLSR at 1501.
419. Claim 8 of the Benson and Tabbot application (see note 326 supra),at least,
was squarely within the C.C.P.A.'s understanding of the "technological arts," yet
was held unpatentable. See notes 343-54 supra and accompanying text.
420. See text accompanying note 348 supra.
421. 502 F.2d at 774, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 179, 4 CLSR at 1507 (Rich, J., dissenting).
422. Brenner, The Future of Computer Programs in the United States Patent

Office, in

THE LAW OF SOFTWARE,

supra note 60, at B-2.

423. Bender, Business & Research Data on Software Development, in
OF SOFTWARE,

THE LAW

supra note 60, at A-15.

424. Brief for Whitlow Computer Sys., Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 9, Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972).
425. See, e.g. notes 49, 50 & 54 supra and accompanying text.
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426
There is
recitation of various descriptive statistics and assertions.
very little disagreement about the fact that the sales volume of the data
processing industry has grown substantially over the last decade and a
half, 427 or that the percentage share of software sales (and costs) has
428
It is also beyond quesgrown more rapidly than that of hardware.

tion that the number of programmers at work has grown during this
period. 429 In 1965 it was said that "the cost of developing a program is
more likely to run into six than five figures, '430 an estimate finding mild
support three years later, at least in the case of fully documented and
4 1
On the
debugged proprietary programs for sale on the open market.
other hand, there is reason to believe that the average program costs
substantially less to develop .432
Until recently, it was frequently asserted that there existed a
"shortage," or "scarcity" of skilled programmers, 43 3 a proposition typically offered in further support of patent protection and usually trace'434
Moreover, it was
able to a 1966 article about the "software gap.
for and supdemand
the
repeatedly contended that the "gap" between
435
growing.
was
products
their
and
ply of programmers
Armed with such information and concepts, the various forces
426. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 423, at A-16.

427. Id.
428. Id. at A-22, A-23 & n.40.
429. Id.
430. Katona, Legal Protectionof ComputerPrograms,47 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 955,
956 (1965).
431. See Pantages, The Problems of Packaged Programs,14 DATAMATION, Apr.
1968, at 75, where Robert Head, of Software Resources Corp., was quoted as saying
that most such programs were offered at $5,000-$25,000, which "ought to be" 1/5 to
1/10 of in-house development cost. If one uses midpoints as means, the mean
program cost was approximately $112,000.
432. Total software costs in 1973 were estimated at $10 billion dollars. See Note,
Computer Software: Beyond the Limits of Existing ProprietaryProtectionPolicy, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 116, 117 (1973). In 1969, it was estimated that 10,000
programs were being written per day. Koller, Computer Software Protection:
Report of An Institute Clinic, 13 IDEA 351 (1969-70), reprinted in 3 R. BIGELOW,
COMPUTER L. SERV. § 4-1, art. 3, at 1. If a 260-day working year is assumed, these
figures imply an approximate average cost per program of something under

$10,000.
433. See, e.g. Koller & Moshman, Patent Protectionfor Computer Software:
Implications for the Industry, 12 IDEA 1109, 1119 (1968); Brothers & Grimaldi,
supra note 248, at 390 n.ll, reprinted in 51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y at 583 n.ll; Note,
ProtectingProprietaryRights of ComputerPrograms:The Need for New Legislative Protection,21 CATH. U.L. REV. 181, 183 (1971).
434. Software Gap-A Growing Crisisfor Computers, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 5, 1966,
at 127.
435. See, e.g., Note, supra note 239, at 370 n.5, citing Camprise, The Software
Dilemma, J. DATA MANAGEMENT, Nov. 1967, at 16, 19; Pantages, supra note 431, at

76; Jones, Programs and Software Should be Patentable-StatementSubmitted
February1, 1968, to the Senate Subcommittee on Patentsand Copyrights,reprinted in 17 COMPUTERS & AUTOMATION, March 1968, at 11, 12.
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joined battle on the economics of program-related patents. Proponents
described patents as the only possible form of protection for the "inventive concepts" in software. 436 The alarming notion was advanced that
failure to supply such protection would "close the door 37
forever on
4'
further inventions in the general-purpose computer field.
In what might be seen as the middle position on this issue, one
writer noted the absence of current patent protection and stated,
"[t]here is no influence on the rate of generation of programs as far as I
am able to detect.-4 38 The particular expression of this position which
provoked the most vigorous response, no doubt because of its perceived
weaknesses, was that made by the 1966 President's Commission on the
Patent System. 439 The Commission, in part, justified its recommendation that programs be denied patent coverage by saying that "the
creation of programs has undergone substantial and satisfactory
growth in the absence of patent protection. '44 0 Objectors responded
that the statement was obviously speculative:
The computer manufacturers today are having great difficulty supplying the programs necessary to operate their own
advanced computers. Who can say how much farther ahead the
software industry would be if competition supported by clear
patent protection had been the case." 1
Even more strongly, it was stated that "there is a mountain of
evidence that the problems in this area have retarded the growth and
'
application of computers since they were invented,"4 42
a contention at
least partly at odds with another response to the Commission's argument: "It should be noted that the initial development of the program
industry took place without the realization on the part of business
443
interests of the full significance of the use of computer programs.
An even more aggressive assault on the economic incentive argument comes from those that contend that program patents would aggravate, rather than alleviate, quality and quantity difficulties prevailing
in the absence of such protection. It has been said that patents would be
more likely to "stifle" program development than to stimulate it, particularly if the threat of litigation were used to deter challenges to weak
patents, and would embroil programmers in mountains of red tape and
444
patent searches before beginning routine programming assignments.
436. Jacobs, supra note 59, at 7, reprinted in 7 CoM. ACM at 583.
437. Hamlin, supra note 93, at 582.
438. Session One, supra note 244, at 191.
439. REPORT, supra note 42.
440. Id. at 13.
441. Nimtz, supra note 58, at 211.
442. Jones, supra note 435, at 12.
443. Note, Software, Statutes and Stare Decisis, 13 How. L.J. 420, 443 (1967).
444. See, e.g., Puckett, Protecting Computer Programs, 13 DATAMATION, Nov.
1967, at 55, 59. See also Note, supra note 53, at 1553.
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Patent opponents presenting such arguments to the Supreme Court
drew comfort from the Department of Justice's assertion that "[it is
difficult to conceive how the field of programming could have grown
faster, or that its past growth has been hampered in any meaningful
4 45
fashion by a lack of investment funds."

Another fundamental economic policy underlying the patent laws
is the provision of incentives to disclose and dedicate inventions to the
public. Those in favor of program-related patents hold out this alleged
benefit, contending that such protection can avoid wasteful duplication
of programming resources. 4 4 1 Opponents counter such arguments by
suggesting that innovators may actually be slower to reveal new ideas
in the face of possible future control by other patentees4 47 and that
resource waste may be aggravated by efforts to "invent around" patented program applications. 448 Predictably, both sides turn to evidence
of software community practice for support.
Some companies adopted proprietary attitudes toward software at
least sixteen years ago. 449 However, in those days the issue could still be
framed in terms of whether developers had a "right" to conceal their
products. 450 Patent opponents referred to a "tradition" against program
secrecy, based in part on the apparent futility of concealment in the
451
face of mobile programmers who wanted to be known for their work,
and in part on the practice of using programs as "a sort of currency. "452
Those favoring patents offered the existence of program exchange
453
bureaus as proof that free exchange required unnatural stimulation,
and argued that such bureaus were sponsored by hardware manufacturers in their own self-interest.4 54 By 1968, Patent Commissioner Brenner admitted that "today, the only significant free contribution of
software to the public comes from the universities and other organizations dedicated to research rather than profit. '455 Four years later it
was contended that secrecy practices had been aggravated by the
45
C.C.P.A.'s extension of patents to program-related inventions. 1
445. Brief for B.E.M.A., supra note 54, at 11, quoting a letter from Donald F.
Turner, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, to E.J. Brenner, Commissioner of Patents (Oct. 21, 1966).
446. See, e.g., Note, supra 114, at 892-93; Kurtz, Patents and Data Processing,6
DATA PROCESSING MAGAZINE, Nov. 1964, at 9, 13; Jacobs, supra note 59, at 7, reprinted from 7 COM. ACM at 583.
447. Puckett, supra note 44, at 125.
448. Note, supra note 53, at 1553.
449. See Smith, What is Proprietaryin MathematicalProgramming?-Impressions of a Panel Discussion, 4 COM. ACM 542 (1961).
450. Id.
451. Puckett, supra note 44, at 133.
452. Session Two, supra note 206, at 202.
453. Kurtz, supra note 446, at 13.
454. Koller & Moshman, supra note 433, at 1119-20.
455. Brenner, supra note 422, at B-1, B-3.
456. Brief for B.E.M.A., supra note 54, at 12.
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Advocates have also suggested that patents would help promote
competition in the data processing industry by encouraging the easy
entry of small firms.457 In the absence of patent protection, claimed one
software developer, hardware manufacturers are the only parties who
could gain economic benefits from computer-program inventions in
view of their "captive market. 45 8 The response to the competition
theory has been that program patents would be of more advantage to
large firms in view of their superior research and legal resources. 45 9 A
hardware manufacturer adopted this position, in altered form, by arguing that superior resources could provide an advantage by permitting a
company to offer customers indemnity for possible program patent
infringement suits. 460 Advocates claim that the integrity of the entire
patent system is at stake. Denial of protection, at least by statute, has
been characterized as "an awesome precedent," 46 1 although it is not
clear why it would be more awesome than the actions taken by the
Supreme Court over the years in other areas of technology. 46 2 In Benson, the Government took the opposite position, flatly asserting that
463
program patents would tend to undermine the entire patent system.
46 4
The denial of patent protection has also been labeled "unfair.
According to one software trade association, "[t]he Patent Office is
discriminating against inventors who chose a program as the preferred
embodiment in favor of a hardware embodiment for the same inventive
concepts. 46 5 Such "equal protection" propositions plainly have no
economic content; they are urged by parties who were willing to invest
resources in the development of software without patent protection. If
there are policy considerations of importance in these propositions,
they are probably best expressed in the following statement, which was
delivered in another context:

457. Jacobs, supra note 60, at B-90.
458. Jones, supra note 435, at 12.
459. Note, supra note 53, at 1554.
460. Brief for Burroughs Corp. as Amicus Curiae at 20-21, Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972).
461. Jacobs, supra note 43, at 372-73; see also, Nimtz, supra note 58, at 212.
462. Cases denying patents to new plant varieties led to a congressional enactment, not modifying section 101, but providing special and limited patent protection for plants. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-64 (1970). Medical techniques, although often denied
patent protection since Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9,856) (denying coverage for the process of administering
ether as an anesthetic), have received no such succor from Congress.
463. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 129, at 17.
464. Comment, Mathematics,Computers and In Re Prater:The Medium and the
Message, 58 GEo. L.J. 391, 392 (1969).
465. ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT SOFTWARE COMPANIES, AISC POSITION PAPER
ON LEGAL PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS (Nov. 21, 1968), reprinted in 3 R.
BIGELOW, COMPUTER L. SERV., app. 4-la, at 1.
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I believe that a patent is more than just a simple economic
right ....
There is a human and emotional element to patents
which is hard to put on paper. There are fundamental questions
of justice, of right, of personal achievement, of glory, and if you
will, of glamour, and these must be considered when incentives
466
to inventors are discussed.
Probably the most telling argument in opposition to program patents is the claim that the Patent Office is not, and may never be,
equipped to cope with the demands that program patent application
review would entail. It constituted an important basis for the recommendation of the President's Commission that programs be denied
patent coverage, 467 and the Government returned to this theme in its
Benson brief:
At present there is no adequate system of classification,
searching technique and research files for computer programming. Consequently, it is highly doubtful whether the
by
criteria for examination of patent applications required
468
can be effectively applied.
Graham v. John Deere Co ....
The issues raised by this objection are usefully separated into those
which involve sheer administrative burden and those which involve the
methodology of prior art searches. In 1968, Patent Commissioner Brenner expressed concern for the potentially large number and complex
nature of the applications and patents which might result from an
approval of such applications; and he raised the possibility of
"thousands flooding the Patent Office" in the face of an already severe
problem of retaining qualified examiners. 469 Patent proponents have
responded to this contention by suggesting the use of computers to
manage the search operation 470 and the creation of a file of all computer
programs now in use to ensure coverage of the prior art.47 1 All such
administrative objections by the Patent Office have been condemned on
the basis of section 131,472 which sets forth the mandate that a patent
43
shall issue once an invention meets the requirements of patentability.
The other problem presented is the difficulty of classifying and
comparing programs. This has been dismissed as merely characteristic
of any new technology, 474 but the history of efforts to develop appropri466. Rabinow, The Anti-Invention Report of the President'sCommission on the
Patent System, 11 IDEA 47, 48 (1967).
467. REPORT, supra note 42, at 13.
468. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 129, at 31.
469. Brenner, supra note 422, at B-5, B-12 & B-13.
470. Note, supra note 239, at 385; Kayton, supra note 73, at B-51.
471. Note, Patentabilityof Computer Programs, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 494, 502
n.62 (1973).
472. 35 U.S.C. § 131 (1970).
473. Id.; Jacobs, supra note 60, at B-87.
474. Nimtz, supra note 58, at 210.
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ate methodologies has been discouraging. The American Patent Law
Association and the Association for Computing Machinery undertook a
classification project in the late 1960's. 475 After the C.C.P.A.'s decision
in In re Benson,4 7 6 the Patent Office worked on the same problem with
4 77
the National Bureau of Standards.
In 1973 it was reported that these
478
naught.
to
come
had
projects
Patent opponents also maintain that patent protection would be of
scant interest to most program developers. Patents are costly to secure 479 and even more so to enforce. 48 0 There is also substantial delay
between filing and issue, a time period that is presently averaging more
than three years in noncomputer cases. Computer applications have
taken even longer at times. An application filed on ENIAC on June 26,
1947 was finally issued on February 4, 1964.481 The Prater application,
which had its first hearing in the C.C.P.A. in 1968, was filed in 1961.482
The Benson application was filed in 1963 ;483 and that of Johnston in

1967 .484
Of course, a clear holding that all program inventions are patentable would substantially reduce the delay, but prolonged case-bycase determination could make delay an instrument of Patent Office
policy. Since an invention is unprotected during Patent Office prosecution, an applicant must either conceal his invention and hope that there
will still be a substantial market when the patent finally issues, or
market it immediately and hope that users will not be able to economically stop using it when the patent finally issues. There has been a
general feeling in the past that the useful life of most software is too
short for either approach to be rewarding, although there may be a
48
trend toward more durable products.
475. Koller, supra note 432, at 362; see also Preston, Searching in the Programming Arts, 5 AM. PAT. L.A. Q.J. 30 (1976).
476. 441 F.2d 682, 169 U.S.P.Q. 548, 2 CLSR 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub nom.
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972).
477. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 129, at 31.
478. Duggan, supra note 347, at 136.
479. Note, supra note 239, at 385.
480. A 1967 study found costs of litigation in nonprogram cases to range from
less than $25,000 to several million dollars. See Harris & Chuppe, Cost of Enforcement of Industrial PropertyRights, 14 IDEA 77, 81 (Conf. Issue 1970).
481. Kurtz, supra note 446, at 10. Since the seventeen year patent term does not
begin to run until issuance of the patent (35 U.S.C. § 154), there is an incentive for
the applicant to engage in delaying tactics if he expects his claims to cover an
important and durable technology.
482. PraterII, 415 F.2d 1393, 1395 n.8, 162 U.S.P.Q. 541, 543 n.8, 2 CLSR 32,34 n.8
(C.C.P.A. 1969).
483. 441 F.2d 682, 169 U.S.P.Q. 548, 2 CLSR 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
484. 502 F.2d 765, 183 U.S.P.Q. 172, 4 CLSR 1491 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
485. See Note, supra note 239, at 370, and sources cited therein; Brothers &
Grimaldi, supra note 248, at 398-99, reprinted in 51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y at 594.
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It has also been suggested that patents would be unimportant to
most software developers because enforcement would be very difficult.486 A program can be appropriated and used without visible,
identifying traces, or its inventive concept can be adapted and then
exploited by a single person acting in secrecy.
Finally, many believe that very few programs could pass the section
103 nonobviousness test. 487 Particularly in the case of applications programs, however costly they are to produce, the programming process is
usually straightforward once the formats for data input, output and
storage are specified.
Patent protection has also been opposed on the grounds that it is
unnecessary in view of the alternative means of protection available.
88
The President's Commission mentioned copyright availability. Most
software developers attempting to exploit their products have relied on
a combination of trade secret and contract protection. Patent advocates
have disputed both the suitability and availability of such alternatives.
Some writers, questioning the suitability of all of the present systems of
proprietary protection in a program context, have proposed special
modifications of the patent system or entirely new forms of protec489
tion.
Arguments against patent protection have occasionally included
criticism of the patent system in general. Patent advocates have sometimes been inclined to impute an antipatent position to the opponents of
program patents. Consequently, something of a debate on the general
policy effects of the patent system has arisen in the program context,
although the issues are rarely pursued past their assertion. There has
been a tendency, for example, for opponents of program patents to refer
with apparent opprobrium to the "monopoly" which program patents
would confer on their possessors. 490 Writers have also questioned the
general relationship between patents and disclosure, 491 and have expressed concern that the real rewards under proprietary protection
systems might go to financiers rather than the actual inventors. 49 2 Program patent supporters have been quick to respond with glowing testimonials to the virtues of the patent system, which, it has been said
486. Brenner, supra note 422, at B-16, B-17.
487. See, e.g., Eltgroth, supra note 198, at 7.
488. REPORT, supra note 42, at 13.
489. See, e.g., Galbi, Proposalfor New Legislation to Protect Computer Programming, 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 280 (1970); Constantine, The Processright:
Protectionfor Programs, 2 MODERN DATA, June 1969, at 24; Session Two, supra
note 206, at 211-12.
490. See, e.g., Puckett, supra note 44, at 132; Note, supra note 53, at 1554; Brief
for Petitioner, supra note 129, at 15.
491. Puckett, supra note 44, at 133.
492. Note, supra note 432, at 146.
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"has helped lead the United States to the scientific and technical lead49 3
ership of the world."
Finally, perhaps as an afterthought, an amicus curiae brief in the
Benson case raised the spectre of injury to both the American data
processing industry and the balance of payments if patent protection
were extended to program-related inventions. 494 Specifically, the brief
suggested that patent protection in the United States might induce the
transmission of data abroad for processing in countries without such
protection. 9 5
B.

Choice of Forum

The question of program patentability can be resolved in two distinct decision-making contexts: (1) entirely within the normal patent
adjudication process in the Patent Office and the courts; or (2) in
Congress, with subsequent elaboration in the adjudicatory process.
Two general issues arise in this connection. One concerns the proper
forum for the resolution of the patentability question. The other focuses
on the type of argumentation that is appropriate in each.
The Report of the President's Commission in 1966,496 and the proposed legislation to implement its recommendation that programs be
denied patent protection, 497 provoked a flood of commentary, most of it
unfavorable. Although much of the commentary expressed dissatisfaction with the specific contents of both the Report and proposed legislation, the relative merits of Congress and the courts as decision makers
were also aired.
A supporter of the proposed legislation justified a preference for
congressional resolution by pointing out that "discussion would not
need to be encumbered by legalistic discussions of prior cases, as were
the Patent Office hearings."4 98 Opponents of the legislation stressed
supposed advantages of the judiciary: "The normal, reliable judicial
process should be followed, which employs adversary proceedings and
real fact situations to clarify the issues." 499 Another writer preferred a
case-by-case treatment because he doubted that a general resolution of
subject matter issues was in fact possible.5 00 The withdrawal of proposed section 106 and its progeny in 1968 marked the beginning of a
brief hiatus in this aspect of the debate, punctuated by the Patent
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
Cong.,
498.
499.
500.

Kurtz, supra note 446, at 12.
Brief for Burroughs Corp., supra note 460, at 19.
Id.
REPORT, supra note 42.
The prototype of this legislation was proposed in Section 106, S. 1042, 90th
1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in the Appendix in this issue.
Galbi, supra note 127, at 181.
Jacobs, supra note 43, at 378. Accord, Nimtz, supra note 58, at 199, 210.
Comment, supra note 48, at 487.
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Office's statement that legislative exclusion of program patents was
"premature.""'1
52
The string of cases favorable to program-related inventions
reawakened interest in congressional action, and the briefs to the Supreme Court in Benson stressed the forum issue. The Government and
its supporters characterized the current law as blocking program patents and urged that any "extension" of patent protection to programrelated inventions should be left to Congress. 503 The respondents urged
that the question should only be addressed in an infringement action
"where these and other circumstances can be fully developed in an
adversary context. '50 4 The Supreme Court adopted the Government's
position, calling for congressional resolution of the patentability issue. 5 5 That decision provoked subsequent unfavorable characterizations of the congressional decision-making process: "Unfortunately,
the carfare to 'the Hill' is apt to prove steep because of the traffic jam
caused by the large lobbying vehicles sent out by companies and groups
with significantly divergent views about just how software should be
506
treated.
The other forum-related, issue-appropriate argument was raised
by patent supporters in response to the wide-ranging policy considerations urged on the Supreme Court by the Government in Benson:
Those arguments. . . invite the Court to explore questions of
policy that require the consideration of a wide range of broad
economic and technological problems. This is not an appropriate
case for the resolution of such questions. The invention here
involved is limited both in its nature and in its economic significance. Moreover, the decision of the court below was an appeal
from a proceeding in the Patent Office in which the record essentially consists solely of legal assertions and counterassertions by
50 7
respondents' attorneys and Patent Office examiners.

IV.

EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAM PATENT DEBATE

It is apparent that one and a half decades of public debate and nine
years of judicial consideration have produced substantial verbiage, but
little agreement, on the legal and policy issues raised by the prospect of
501. Brenner, supra note 422, at B-7, B-8.
502. See notes 258-342 supra and accompanying text.
503. See Brief for IBM, supra note 49, at 15; Brief for Burroughs Corp., supra
note 460, at 24; Brief for B.E.M.A., supra note 54, at 29.
504. Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 6, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972).
505. 409 U.S. 63, 73, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 677, 3 CLSR 256, 263 (1972).
506. Milgrim, Software, Carfareand Benson, 13 JURIMFTRICS J. 240, 241 (1973).
See also Jacobs, supra note 347, at 135.
507. Brief for Respondent, supra note 504, at 5-6. This criticism was echoed in
Miller, supra note 235, at 155.
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program-related patents. There have been judicial decisions, to be sure.
However, as already noted, these have been largely directed to the
question of subject matter, and their permanence in the face of further
judicial review and possible congressional action is uncertain. Section
V will resume the discussion of the normative questions where the
historical debate leaves off.50 8 First, however, the debate itself will be
examined for lessons relevant to the policy issues.
A.

Legal Discussion

It is difficult to avoid the harsh conclusion that much of what has
been said on the program patent issue has been unenlightening and, at
times, nonsensical, if one is seeking a rational resolution of the issues. If
objections to patents based on the asserted anticipation of program
inventions are to be taken seriously, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the digital computer was anticipated by, if not intended as a
parody of, the wonderful machine of Lagado described by Jonathan
5 9
Swift in Gulliver's Travels. 1
The subject matter debate has descended to this Swiftian level on
occasion. One example is provided by the exercises in characterizing
programs and algorithms which have often masqueraded as attempts at
508. See notes 555-57 infra and accompanying text.
509. The first professor I saw was in a very large room, with forty pupils about
him. After salutation, observing me to look earnestly upon a frame, which took up
the greatest part of both the length and breadth of the room, he said, perhaps I
might wonder to see him employed in a project for improving speculative knowledge by practical and mechanical operations. But the world would soon be sensible
of its usefulness; and he flattered himself, that a more noble exalted thought never
sprang in any other man's head. Every one knows how laborious the usual method
is of attaining to arts and sciences; whereas, by his contrivance, the most ignorant
person, at a reasonable charge, and with a little bodily labour, may write books in
philosophy, poetry, politicks, law, mathematicks, and theology, with the least assistance from genius or study. He then led me to the frame, about the sides whereof
all his pupils stood in ranks. It was twenty feet square, placed in the middle of the
room. The superficies was composed of several bits of wood, about the bigness of a
die, but some larger than others. They were all linked together by slender wires.
These bits of wood were covered on every square with paper pasted on them; and
on these papers were written all the words of their language in their several moods,
tenses, and declensions, but without any order. The professor then desired me to
observe, for he was going to set his engine at work. The pupils at his command,
took each of them hold of an iron handle, whereof there were forty fixed round the
edges of the frame; and giving them a sudden turn, the whole disposition of the
words was entirely changed. He then commanded six and thirty of the lads to read
the several lines softly as they appeared upon the frame; and where they found
three or four words together that might make part of a sentence, they dictated to
the four remaining boys who were scribes. This work was repeated three or four
times, and at every turn the engine was so contrived, that the words shifted into
new places, as the square bits of wood moved, upside down.
Six hours a-day the young students were employed in this labour and the
professor shewed me several volumes in large folio already collected, of broken

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1

"definition. 5 10 Fortunately, these maneuvers have been partly avoided
by the decisions of patent applicants to make claims on programs in
combination with computers and other phenomena. More tenacious
have been efforts to associate machine operations with human thought
processes, efforts which frequently rivaled the anticipation arguments
in absurdity. Patent proponents have been on firmer ground on the
subject matter issue, but it would be easy to overstate their contribution
to a meaningful resolution of this quandary. They have ignored persistent efforts by the Supreme Court to put limits on the scope of patent
rights by resorting to subject matter doctrines. Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the brain-machine distinction so often and so
thoroughly urged by patent proponents was not in fact clearly understood from the beginning by just about everyone.
In sum, one side has tended to argue the ridiculous while the other
has countered with the obvious. The consequence has been very little
contribution to developing reasonable limitations on the scope of program-related patents. Efforts to construct doctrines of limitation appropriate to this subject matter would certainly have been beneficial in
moderating the divergence between the C.C.P.A., which has revealed a
preference for ignoring limitation policies, and the Supreme Court,
which has poorly articulated and defended preemption limitations.
Nor has much light been shed on the reconciliation of programrelated patents with the policies underlying nonobviousness and disclosure requirements. These policies have tended to serve in roles ancillary
to subject matter attacks on patentability. It is rare to find discussions
of these requirements which make any meaningful effort to elaborate
on the linkage between fundamental patent policies and proposed or
projected outcomes.
B.

Policy Discussion
If anything, the policy debate has been even less useful than its

sentences, which he intended to piece together; and, out of those rich materials, to
give the world a compleat body of all arts and sciences; which, however, might still
be improved, and much expedited, if the publick would raise a fund for making
and employing five hundred such frames in Lagado, and oblige the managers to
contribute in common their several collections.
He assured me, that this invention had employed all his thoughts from his
youth; that he had emptied the whole vocabulary into his frame, and made the
strictest compution of the general proportion there is in books between the numbers of particles, nouns, and verbs, and other parts of speech.
I made my humblest acknowledgement to this illustrious person for his great
communicativeness; and promised, if ever I had the good fortune to return to my
native country, that I would do him justice, as the sole inventor of this wonderful
machine.
J. Swift, Gulliver's Travels, in 36 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 109 (R.
Hutchins ed. 1952).
510. See notes 44-64 supra and accompanying text.
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more strictly "legal" counterpart. Frequently encountered, for example, are references to the economic size of the data processing industry
and the significance of computer applications to society.5 11 It has also
been pointed out repeatedly that patents, even if available for programrelated inventions, would be of scant interest to most program developers either because the conditions of patentability would rarely be met
or because the present patent system is not well suited to their economic
needs.5 12 Such observations are no doubt valid, but commentators who
offer them often appear not to realize that they cut both ways on the
patentability question without further elaboration.
The critically important, economic issues have received very little
quantification. It is not ususual to find the commentary on these issues
confined to vague assertions concerning the magnitude and direction of
behavioral consequences of one or another outcome. The audience has
been told that patents would lead to more program innovations; yet, it
has also been informed that less innovation would result. More secrecy
has been predicted in the event of no patents. A denial of patentability
has been described as fatal to program innovation, on the one hand,
while quite the opposite has been asserted due to the purported inhibitory effects of patents.51 3
References to more specific economic phenomena have been equally lacking in accuracy. A prominent example frequently offered in
support of patentability was the "shortage" of programmers in the
middle and late 1960's.14 Although more recent articles promoting
patentability no longer talk about such a "shortage," extended consideration of the shortage issue is warranted by both the frequency of
its former reference and the evidence it provides of the tendency to use
labels without providing quantitative support.
The word "shortage" can refer to a variety of economic phenomena,
and different policy implications attach to each. On the most superficial
level, it can be seen as a proxy for "we want more"-a usage which
merely puts programmers into the class of all resources termed
"economic." Alternatively, an equilibrium interpretation of the word
"shortage" might imply that the market for programmers is not at the
equilibrium price (i.e., at the intersection of hypothesized demand and
supply functions). This would necessarily imply that something is preventing either the employment of some programmers who are already
trained and willing to work, or the price of programmers from rising to
the equilibrium level. There is no evidence of the former. As for the
latter, one commentator has claimed that programmers' salaries may
511.
512.
513.
514.

See
See
See
See

notes
notes
notes
notes

426-29
444-45
422-95
433-35

supra and accompanying text.
& 486-89 supra and accompanying text.
supra and accompanying text.
supra and accompanying text.
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have been constrained by executive compensation structures.5 15 The
patent law is surely not an appropriate policy instrument for the correction of that type of market imperfection.
From a static perspective, a "shortage" of programmers might also
be defined as the existence of unused capacity of an economic complement-in this case, digital computer capacity. But an understanding of
express capacity requires a dynamic, rather than static, perspective.
How did it arise? One possible explanation was a time lag in programmer supply; persons encouraged to enter the programming profession by rising salaries have to spend time in training. Another possibility was that the supply of the complement to programmers-digital
computers of a particular technological level-exhibited discontinuities due to the economics of manufacture and the stepwise progression of hardware technology. Yet another cause of disequilibrium
may have been a failure by hardware buyers to calculate accurately the
total cost of purchasing and operating their machines. Nor was idle
hardware necessarily nonfunctional. At one time firms displayed their
computer installations prominently for the benefit of customers, investors and other visitors.
No doubt many other factors behind the shortage of programmers
could be adduced, but these are sufficient to show that the shortage was
at all times obviously a temporary phenomenon.5 16 In fact, the shortage
now appears to be over. Even had the underlying factors been permanent in the absence of social intervention, the general failure of
commentators to look behind the "shortage" label obscured the unsuitability of the patent system as a remedial policy instrument.
Of more serious concern is the adequacy in quantity and quality of
software itself. Yet, even when discussions have moved beyond insubstantial prophecies of the end of software innovation, economic analysis has tended to stop at the stage of mere declarations, occasionally
supported by the recitation of a few anecodotes.
Also unpersuasive have been arguments in favor of patents grounded on appeals to justice and equal protection for innovators of hardware and software. There has been no suggestion that software innovators must divulge their creations. Moreover, there is no apparent
reason why the people who invested in software production at a time
when patent protection was not clearly available should now be granted such protection merely because hardware innovators have it. If it is
515. Puckett, supra note 44, at 122.
516. The probable impermanence of the programmer "shortage" was pointed
out in the mid-1960's in such articles as Sundeen, General Purpose Software, 14
DATAMATION, Jan. 1968, at 22. These discussions were typically relegated to footnotes in the written debate of program patents on the rare occasions that they were
mentioned at all.
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assumed that the absence of patent protection reduces the relative
returns to software investment, this in itself indicates only that the
complaining software producers should invest their capital in hardware
innovation instead. It is unlikely that the patent law, which can only be
benefit, should be altered
justified on the basis of producing a net social
5 17
in response to individual investment errors.
. Lastly, a reasonable argument can be made that the courts are not
the proper forum for an airing of the Patent Office's manpower
constraints, although such administrative factors are often weighed in
other legal areas. However, the contention that other policy issues,
including those concerning the review of prior art, should not be urged
on the courts seems untenable.
It is said that cases should be resolved solely in light of the legal
issues. But what is the context of legal doctrines except the policies they
promote? Adjudication is necessary only because new phenomena present themselves for inclusion in the doctrinal categories defined by
statutes and the body of historical case law. If adjudication is to rise
above exercises in asserting that the subject matter is now rather like a
tree, now rather like a rope, now rather like a tool of the mind, the
policies behind the law must be considered. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has consistently enunciated patent law doctrines after policy
reflection, and clearly feels obliged to do so, as the John Deere decision
518
indicates.
The problem in the program-related patent area is not that policy
issues have been argued, but that they have been argued poorly, a
situation for which those on both sides of the patent controversy bear
equal responsibility.
C. Factors Shaping the Debate
In the final analysis, the behavior of individuals and the institutions they represent is very difficult for an observer to explain with
precision. Nevertheless, it is important to examine the program patent
debate for possible explanations of its character, both to put in perspec517. In F.

MACHLUP, THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE

UNITED STATES (1962), the author presented an interesting perspective on the

concept of "intellectual property":
Besides the various incentive theories of patent protection there has been a
legal and moral theory which claimed that an inventor has, by "natural
law," a "property right" in his idea and that a patent is merely a practical
way of confirming this property right. This theory, which had its origin in
France, was put forth for a political reason: the word "property" aroused
favorable sentiments, the word "monopoly" unfavorable ones. Thus, it was
dangerous to justify the patent as a monopoly grant, even though it was to
serve good purposes.
Id. at 167.
518. 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459 (1966).
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tive its shortcomings and to extract possible insights into the patentability issue. In all cases, the observations should be considered hypotheses, consistent with available evidence.
Part of the explanation for the disappointing nature of much of the
debate can be traced to the patent laws themselves. The decision of
Congress to permit the general judiciary to adjudicate patent issues
(with certain jurisdictional modifications) insured that the policies of
judicial administration would impinge upon the disposition of patent
cases. Above all, it opened the door to reliance upon precedent, including very old precedent, which in general promotes the values of economy, uniformity and reviewability to the exclusion of other more desirable factors.
The real-world "stuff" of the patent law, by contrast, is characterized by flux in both theory and substance. Not only has technology
itself undergone dramatic changes since the days of Cochrane v. Deener,51 9 but so too has the conceptual apparatus employed in the development and practice of technology.52 0 The same can be said for the
other, non-legal cornerstone of patent law-economics-with the additional observation that part of the very "stuff" of economics, the profile
of attitudes which characterizes the "economic culture" of American
society, has also changed in important respects during the last century.
Appreciation of these changes is slow to filter down to those who are
not experts in these disciplines.
Further, the pace of general comprehension is progressively retarded by increased specialization, the growing sophistication of tools and
vocabulary, and the explosion of written information. 521 The legal profession and the judiciary, laden with the business of daily litigation,
have not been particularly alert to the content and significance of these
22
changes.
Finally, the courts have been required to draw somewhat arbitrary
lines, on a case-by-case basis, when such issues as nonobviousness and
519. 94 U.S. 780 (1876). See notes 159-70 supra and accompanying test.
520. The most dramatic example is perhaps the collapse of the conceptual line
demarcating matter from energy and the consequential revolutionary change in
the fundamental "paradigm" of physics, as interpreted in T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). A host of less dramatic, but more immediate,
changes have accompanied each unanticipated development in science and technology, including the emergence of digital computation itself.
521. That these phenomena have threatened the advance of scientific knowledge
itself has been presented in the works of Derek John de Solla Price, whose ideas
were given serious attention by at least the Soviet government and spawned a
distinct discipline labeled the "science of science" (nauka o nauke). See, e.g., D.
PRICE, LITTLE SCIENCE, BIG SCIENCE (1963).

522. Intradisciplinary disagreement often compounds the insensitivity of the
judiciary to advances in non-legal areas of knowledge, as the history of the "legal
insanity" test in the federal courts of appeals attests.
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infringement have been presented. Congress has both conditioned and
constrained the evolution of the subject matter doctrine by its choice of
wording for sections 100(b) and 101, creating doctrines which diverge,
at least in verbal formulation, depending upon whether an invention is
claimed as a "process" or a "machine." The arbitrariness of this particular distinction has prompted persuasive proposals for a reformulation of section 101523 and is graphically illustrated in the program
patent area by the practice of applicants of structuring their process
claims in apparatus terms. Patent adjudication has thus been cast in a
precedential, decision-making mold, using an arbitrary vocabulary, in
an effoit to cope with the constantly shifting subject matter. This has
resulted in massive confusion in the legal discussion of program
patents.
As the following passage indicates, a theoretical and empirical
understanding of the dynamics of innovation is unsatisfactory when
measured by the needs of public decision making:
The plain fact is that economists have neglected the study of
technical change at the structural and micro level to the point
where we are quite incapable of answering many of the most
important questions of our day ....
Where are the economists
even, who are really studying the
impact
of automation? And the
524
answer is, practically nowhere.
These economic uncertainties create the opportunity for policy confusion.
The difficulty of resolving the policy issues can be illustrated by a
brief discussion of the question of whether the extension of patent
coverage to software would, on the whole, stimulate or retard program
innovation. Although the motivations to innovate are varied and
complex, the patent system is directed to the maximization motive of
investors. A wealth-maximizing investor will invest in innovative activity as long as the present value (i.e., the absolute dollar value, discounted at the expected rate of return of his least attractive alternative
investment opportunity) of the expected revenue stream from that investment exceeds the present value of all expected expenditures, including the initial investment necessary to produce that revenue
stream.5 25 Concealed in that decision model, however, are a host of
523. See, e.g., Eggert, Uses, New Uses, and Chemical Patents-A Proposal,51 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 768, 785 (1969), where it is suggested that claims be heard for and
confined to "how-to-makes" and "how-to-uses" (hyphens added).
524. Boulding, Richard T. Ely Lecture: The Economics of Knowledge and the
Knowledge of Economics, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 12 (Conf. issue 1966).
525. The theoretical tools for characterizing that decision process are in fact
substantially more sophisticated than those described. For example, the behavior
of the future costs and revenues, as well as the success of the innovative venture
itself, exhibit uncertainty. One approach to the modeling of decisions under uncertainty has the investor constructing subjective probability distributions of the
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complex factors defining expected costs and revenues, some of which
are related to the prevailing legal systems of proprietary protection.
Given subjective probability functions for the nonlegal factors, the
importance of patent availability in the investor's decision can be summarized in three questions:
(1) What is the expected net present value of patent protection, measured incrementally, compared with no legal protection
of the inventive concepts at all?
(2) What is the corresponding incremental value of the best
alternative means of legal protection? and,
(3) Is patent protection superior to the best alternative and,
if so, by how much?
The answer to the first question is presently quite unclear. Even if
one assumes that all program-related inventions are patentable subject
matter, the economic return will be affected by such factors as disclosure and nonobviousness requirements, the problems and costs of detecting and prosecuting suspected infringement, and the ultimate judicial resolution of the equivalence question. Moreover, the value to
innovators of patent protection is constantly changing because of an
erosion process that has been dubbed the "socialization" of the patent
526
system.
Alternative means of protection include reliance on trade secret
law, contractual arrangements and copyright. 27 Assuming that these
alternatives are in fact available, the relative merits of patent protection are hotly disputed. Such alternatives have been denigrated by
commentators arguing in favor of patentability, usually on the grounds
that only patents offer protection of inventive concepts and induce
uncertain outcomes, of which the expected value, as a measure of central tendency,
is only one relevant parameter. The existence of "risk preferences" compels consideration of an additional parameter-the dispersion of the subjective probability
distributions. Since it is commonly supposed that investors are generally risk
averse, the weight they give future net cash flows is something less than their
expected value; the magnitude of the difference varying directly with the variability of the estimated net flows. On the other hand, investors can "hedge" by
constructing a portfolio of investment projects so that the outcomes of particularly
important future events have offsetting effects across the portfolio with a consequent reduction in activities. To the extent that the decision model is valid, this
implies that individual investment decisions cannot be analyzed in isolation from
the other activities of a particular investor.
526. Brenner, The Challenges to the PatentSystem in the 1970's, 53 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 407, 420 (1971). That erosion is in large measure due to limitations imposed by
antitrust doctrines. See, e.g., Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the
Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267 (1966).
527. The Copyright Office accepts computer programs for registration, but
without expressing an opinion as to the legal effects of doing so. See UNITED
STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 61 (1976). The availability and utility of copyright protection has received nearly as much attention from commentators as the
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public disclosure and marketing. 52 8 On the other hand, patents also
entail unusually heavy costs and delays, and the expected value is
heavily dependent on the prospects of detecting and prosecuting infringements.
Thus the usefulness of patent protection is open to question.
Nevertheless, if the existence of other present or potential patentees
were ignored, there could be no purely allocative objection to extending
patent coverage for, at worst, the level of innovation would remain the
same as in the absence of patents.
Complications arise, however, when the model is expanded to admit the existence of other innovators, present or potential, in related
areas of technology. The criterion of social choice is now the net effect
of patents on the innovative activity of the entire community. The
resultant economic uncertainties substantially increase. Any particular
investor's calculus must necessarily include the possiblity of infringement actions brought by existing patent holders, either with reasonable
cause or for a deterrent effect. Additionally, innovators may feel obliged to seek patents on developments which they could more effectively exploit through trade secret or contract, merely to prevent foreclosure by others who might file patent applications on the same invention. These and other counterproductive effects of the patent system are
frequently suggested in economics literature, but their ultimate significance cannot be determined at the present level of theoretical and
empirical understanding.52 9
patent question. See, e.g., Scafetta, ComputerSoftware Protection:The Copyright
Revision Bills and Alternatives, 8 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 381 (1975);
Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs,84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 340-51 (1970); Note, Copyright Protectionfor Computer Programs,64 COLUM. L. REV. 1274 (1964).
528. Jacobs, supra note 59, at 7, reprinted in 7 COM. ACM at 583; Bender,
Computer Programs:Should They Be Patentable?,68 COLUM. L. REV. 241, 245-46,
248 (1968).
529. Among the contributions in this area are Plant, The Economic Theory
Concerning Patentsfor Inventions, 1 ECONOMICA (NS) 30 (1934); MACHLUP, supra
note 517, at 161-76; F. VAUGHAN, THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM (1956); E.
MANSFIELD, THE ECONOMICS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, 34-36, 207-14 (1968).
A frequently encountered argument, for example, is that patents may be
sought on products in order to suppress their exploitation rather than to promote
it. Vaughan relies on a Federal Communications Commission report entitled INVESTIGATION OF THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES (H.R. 430, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess.) to support the following:
American Telephone, after obtaining thousands of patents upon various
alternate methods of accomplishing specific results, used some of them
and let others lie dormant. Once a selection was developed, standardized,
produced, and installed on a large scale, it acquired subsequent inventions
that threatened its position, not to develop and use, but to protect its
position and salvage its investment in old equipment. To maintain that only
the used inventions were worthwhile assumes an omniscience and disin-
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Major Participantsin The Debate

The state of patent law and the economics of innovation provide
fertile soil for confusion. The motivation to cultivate it is suggested by
the identity of the parties to the debate. Some of the more prominent
proponents of patent availability have been:
(1) Major oil companies. Oil companies began attempts to
gain patent protection for software in the early 1950's
through broadly drafted claims and the disclosure of analog
implementations. The Prater and Wei application, with Mobil Oil Corporation the apparent real party in interest, 30 was
filed in 1961 and explicitly disclosed the possibility of digital
computer practice.5 3' The change in application tactics may
have been due to the oblique encouragement of the dicta in
Egan 32 and the growing complexity of analog surrogates.
533
Oil companies also may have had interests in the Foster
and Musgrave534 applications filed in 1964 and 1965, respectively.
(2)

Bell Telephone Laboratories,Inc.

It can be safely said that

Bell Labs has been in the vanguard of the forces arguing for
patent protection. Of the thirteen cases reviewed above, six
appear to have been prosecuted by Bell Labs, as well as its
appearing as amicus curiae in Prater.535 Bell Labs has been
among the most daring, 36 repeatedly pushing against the
terestedness contrary to fact.
supra at 234.
530. One effect of the statutory application requirements is that divination of the
real party in interest in patent cases is sometimes very difficult. In a rare reference
to such matters, the court in PraterII mentioned that "[t]he real party in interest
appearsto be Mobil Oil Corporation." 415 F.2d 1393, 1395 n.8, 162 U.S.P.Q. 541,543
n.8, 2 CLSR 32, 34 n.8 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (emphasis added). The most reliable guide in
such matters is often the identity of the attorneys arguing the case.
531. See text accompanying note 261 supra.
532. See text accompanying note 132 supra.
533. See notes 321-24 supra and accompanying text.
534. See notes 306-20 supra and accompanying text.
535. See Prater11, 415 F.2d 1393,1394 n.1 & 1395 n.5, 162 U.S.P.Q. 541,542 n.1 &
543 n.5, 2 CLSR 32, 33 nn.1 & 5 (C.C.P.A. 1969). The six cases, which appeared to
have been prosecuted by Bell Labs include In re Mahony, 421 F.2d 742,164 U.S.P.Q.
572, 2 CLSR 587 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 169 U.S.P.Q. 548, 2
CLSR 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175
U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972); In re McIlroy, 442 F.2d 1397, 170 U.S.P.Q. 31, 3
CLSR 81 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 173 U.S.P.Q. 430, 3 CLSR
173 (C.C.P.A. 1972); In re Knowlton, 481 F.2d 1357, 178 U.S.P.Q. 486, 4 CLSR 1480
(C.C.P.A. 1973); and In re Brandstadter, 484 F.2d 1395,179 U.S.P.Q. 286,4 CLSR 976
VAUGHAN,

(C.C.P.A. 1973).

536. Not so daring, however, as to persist in defending process claims after
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972), and In re
Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392, 178 U.S.P.Q. 35,4 CLSR 66 (C.C.P.A. 1973), were handed
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limits of scope-related concerns by presenting claims drawn
to internal computer operations, and testing disclosure requirements by failing to supply actual listings in some in537
stances.
(3) Attorneys active in the prosecution of program-related
claims. Morton C. Jacobs, one of the most prolific
contributors to the secondary literature, 538 represented the
holder of the "first software patent" to be issued by the
Patent Office. 53 9 He also filed an amicus curiae brief in Prater and was counsel for the respondent in Johnston.Among
other prominent writers in favor of patents has been
Richard Kurtz,50 counsel for the patent applicants in Prater,
Musgrave, and Foster.
Major patent opponents have included:
(1) The Patent Office. Although always seemingly cool to patents on program-related inventions, it has only been since
1968 that the Patent Office has become an adamant opponent. This opposition commenced shortly after the issuance of the "first software patent ' ' and culminated in
the heroic multiplication of objections revealed in the cases
previously discussed.
(2) The President's Commission on the Patent System. Although entering only a single cryptic appearance in 1966,542
the President's Commission apparently stimulated the brief
flurry of legislative proposals in the late 1960's 5 4 3 and was
5 44
quoted by the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.
(3) Hardware Manufacturers. Occasional entries have been
made by several hardware manufacturers and their trade
association, the Business Equipment Manufacturers' Association (B.E.M.A.). 45 However, by far the most indefatigable
opponent of patents in this group has been IBM, sponsoring
down. See In re Brandstadter, 484 F.2d 1395, 1400 n.1, 179 U.S.P.Q. 286, 290 n.l, 4
CLSR 976, 983 n.1 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
537. This tactic failed in Brandstadter,id.
538. For a listing of his writings, see the Bibliography in this issue.
539. That this was actually the first to issue is disputed, but it was so reported in
First Patent is Issued for Software; Full Implications Are Not Yet Known, Computerworld, June 19, 1968, at 1, col. 1. Doubts in the Patent Office about the
implications of the patent were quickly manifested by a combination of reticence
to accept the patent and a feeble attempt to distinguish the invention. Patent Office
is Ruffled by First Software Patent,Computerworld, June 26, 1968, at 3, col. 3.
540. For a listing of his writings, see the Bibliography in this issue.
541. See note 539 supra.
542. REPORT, supra note 42.
543. See note 497 supra.
544. 409 U.S. at 72, 175 U.S.P.Q. at 677, 3 CLSR at 262.
545. Honeywell filed amicus curiae briefs in both PraterII and Benson. See
note 50 supra. Burroughs and B.E.M.A. also filed amicus curiae briefs in Benson.
See notes 54 & 460 supra.
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546
appearing at
articles, proposing alternative legislation,
547
Patent Office hearings, and filing amicus curiae briefs. A
significant portion of the arguments advanced by the Patent
Office in litigation can be recognized in earlier IBM dissertations.

Although these parties have largely controlled the debate, numerous articles on the subject have also appeared. The topic has stimulated
the appearance of many law review notes and comments of widely
varying quality.148 Computer trade publications have also reported and
exhibiting profound, if
commented on the issues, although sometimes
5 49
excusable, misunderstandings of patent law.
Finally, a curious feature of the debate has been the relative absence of contributions by academic lawyers, with the exception of
Professor Irving Kayton and a few associates at George Washington
University. This is particularly surprising since the program issue has
forced a review of many principles basic to patent law and will probably not pass without affecting that law in its more general respects.
E.

Motivations of the Parties

It is interesting, if risky, to consider the possible motives of the
participants to the debate, and especially those of Bell Labs, IBM and
the Patent Office. These particular parties have tended to control the
agenda, and identification of their goals might go far toward answering
the question of whether, and to what extent, the entire issue is of
general importance.
That Bell Labs and IBM have been acting out of perceived selfinterest goes without saying. The scanty public record cannot support
an extended refinement of that observation; but, enough is available for
the formulation of several hypotheses. It is, for example, possible that
Bell Labs' applications, as revealed in the cases, can be taken at face
value as efforts to protect software innovation. It is also possible,
however, to imagine something like the early ploy of disclosing only an
analog implementation, but in reverse, with software disclosure being
used to avoid the teaching of intended hardware implementation, hoping that an equivalence will later be found. Such an interpretation is
546. See Galbi, supra note 489.
547. See, e.g. note 49 supra.
548. An exhaustive Bibliography on this topic appears in this issue.
549. For example, the Goetz patent prompted the following:
The possibility of patenting software opens up a whole vista of situations.
If you simulate the operation of a steel mill in software, for instance, you
may wind up with the basic material to have a steel patent without necessarily ever had (sic) to build the mill!
FirstSoftware Patent: Was ProgramPatented?Or Was It the 'Technique'?, Computerworld, July 3, 1968, at 4, col. 3. This prospect is beyond the worst nightmares
of opponents of program patents.
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reinforced by the observation that the high-volume, repetitive applications characteristic of the communications field are particularly wellsuited to hardware implementation.
IBM's opposition to program patents, on the other hand, is frequently attributed to a supposed concern that patents would reduce the
use of computer hardware by raising the total cost to users and by
chilling user-developed innovations. This would supply a motive if IBM
believed that a significant number of programs or related inventions
could survive the various hurdles of patentability and if it was expected
that the net effect would be to reduce data processing activity. A more
intriguing hypothesis, however, is suggested by the following account:
At the time of this "invention" by Benson and Tabbot, AT&T
was designing its ESS (Electronic Switching System) for both
circuit switching and generalized data processing. The Benson
and Tabbot patent application directly sprang from the ESS
computer software development.
AT&T has consistently utilized its patents to obtain grantbacks from its licensees as a condition to granting a license. A
patent license grant-back gives the licensor full access to all
future improvements and know-how that the licensee develops
as a result of being licensed under the original patent. (While
many observers feel that such grant-backs are illegal per se
under the antitrust laws, present court decisions have not yet
reached that conclusion.)
In addition, AT&T has interpreted its 1956 consent decree as
allowing Western Electric to sell to anyone any products which it
can legally sell to Bell companies for use in furnishing common
carrier communications services; e.g., it could resell the ESS and
its components to any prospective purchaser.
On the other hand, IBM has developed its own mini-ESS
device, the 2750, which is being marketed only in Europe by its
World Trade subsidiary. The 2750 Voice & Data Switching System could have an obvious effect upon AT&T's marketing in the
PBX area. PBX (and Centrex) is reputably one of the most profitable items in Western Electric's inventory. Further, with the Carter-phone Decision, allowing attachment of non-Bell devices (sic)
'foreign attachments'-this market has been particularly vulnerable to an electronics invasion. (The ESS PBX, like the 2750, is
both cheaper and technologically superior to the electro-mechanical PBX's presently installed.)"'0
It would indeed be ironic if much of the program-related patent
struggle were explicable as maneuvering in a contest for markets between corporate giants. 551 Yet, such an hypothesis would go far toward
550. Duggan, supra note 347, at 137-38 (emphasis in original).
551. It was recently reported that:
After being belted in recent years by a series of adverse rulings from the
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explaining the Antitrust Division's intervention. It would also make the
absence of the academic legal community understandable, since a position in the debate could all too easily be construed as association with
the enterprise on the corresponding side of the issue.
What has motivated the Patent Office position? An adequate explanation would have to be consistent with the prolonged lack of enthusiasm for such patents, the sudden hardening of that position in
1968, and the sustained vigor of the opposition despite changes in
Commissioners since 1969. An explanation would also have to take
account of the fact that while the Patent Office undoubtedly is obliged
to promote the public interest, it has its own set of institutional interests to defend. Given the inadequacy of the public record, it can only be
surmised that the probable basis of Patent Office behavior can be found
in some combination of the following:
A belief that computer programs pose unprecedented proba solulems in the anticipation and prior art areas and that
552
tion to these problems is not foreseeably available.
(2) A belief that a clear holding of patentability would produce
a flood of applications and that regardless of their survival
rate, their processing would tax Patent Office resources far
beyond Congress' willingness to provide additional sup553
port.
(3) A concern that program-related patents could be used to
gain economic leverage in areas previously denied patent
coverage, coupled with an appreciation of the difficulty of
devising a scope-limiting doctrine which could adequately
distinguish such cases.
(4) An unwillingness to see the patent system exploited as a tool
in the struggle between major economic interests, a position
perhaps stiffened by Department of Justice input.
(5) A concern for the integrity of the administrative process
engendered by such phenomena as uncooperative and possibly abusive responses by interested parties to Patent Office
opinion solicitations5 5 4 and the exploitation of possible Patent Office oversights in issuing such patents.
(1)

Federal Communications Commission, Bell has seen its onetime captive
business erode as such companies as RCA, International Business Machines, and MCI Telecommunications carved out niches in the market for
communications and equipment.
AT&T Goes Back to School to Learn How to Sell, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 11, 1975, at 56.
552. See notes 474-78 supra and accompanying text.
553. See note 469 supra and accompanying text. It should be noted, however,
that despite the apparent failure of such a "flood" to materialize following Prater
H and In re Bernhart, Patent Office opposition to program-related patents has
continued.
554. Events subsequent to the proposal of Guidelines on the program patent
issue in 1966 were reported as follows:
While there was no dearth of industry response on October 4, it was all
negative. As E.R. Reynolds, assistant commissioner of patents, suggested,
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(6)

V.

Finally, once it was decided to take an adamant stance, a
perceived requirements to defend it without compromise.

CONCLUSION

Although an attempt to resolve the program patent question is
beyond the scope of this article, it is possible to suggest some factors
relevant to future consideration of the issue.
A.

Desirabilityof Program-RelatedPatents

When delivered in a theoretical vaccum, the declaration that the
patent system has "worked well" is no more cogent than the assertion
that there is "enough software." While it is true that such macroeconomic assertions can never be put to rigorous test, more theoretical and empirical investigation could substantially refine the understanding of a suitable system for stimulating technological innovation.
Perhaps Congress will sponsor such research.
In the absence of a sweeping change, however, the present system
reveals a series of authoritative congressional choices on many of the
fundamental issues raised by patents. Program-related inventions
should be routinely processed through the system unless shown to
present novel and significant challenges to fundamental patent policies.
As has often been said, programs conceived as either processes occurring within computers or as peculiar arrays of computer component
states are not in any respect mental. Applicants seriously interested in
claiming only machine phenomena can avoid the imputation of efforts
to claim nonmachine implementations by drafting trivial claim limitations. Moreover, subject matter objections that rely on such characterization of programming as "setting switches" and the like are simply
insubstantial. What technological innovations, whether viewed as processes or as machines, cannot be characterized as mere rearrangements
in time and space of already known phenomena?
Nor is the apparent preemption of an idea or an algorithm a sufficient ground of objection, unless those terms are heavily infused with
limiting connotations. All patents preempt such phenomena; otherwise,
there could be no infringement by anything other than the original,
physical assembly created by the patentee. Such objections have often
constituted the stated foundation of attacks on program-related patents. If they were a comprehensive statement of the peculiarities of the
the critics-instead of knocking the guidelines-might have employed their
time more profitably by proposing an acceptable alternative. (Bell Telephone Labs and a few of the others did so, in written comments filed
afterward.) Because of the industry's unconstructive criticism, the patent
office is probably no nearer a usable policy now than it was last August.
Hirsch, The Patent Office Examines Software: Guidelines Get Graded Down, 12
DATAMATION, Nov. 1966, at 79.
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subject matter, the case for patentability would be compelling. The
issue is not so readily resolved, however, since program inventions
differ from other types of technology in potentionally important respects.
One critical difference is that programs may require no significant
investment in physical structures at either the inventive or exploitative
stage. Program development may entail the use of computer hardware,
and exploitation ultimately requires computer operations. But both the
innovator and the user may rent hardware time or impose incremental
demands on facilities already devoted in large part to other activities at
a trivial incremental cost. Moreover, the final product can be recorded
and replicated for marketing purposes or for the innovator's own use at
an insignificant cost in materials. Some possible consequences of this
difference are:
(1) Potential innovators are not limited in number by the burden of investment in expensive research and development
facilities. Any person with a modicum of training in programming skills is a potential inventor, and there is an
enormous and growing volume of programs. As a result, in
comparison with other techological areas, there exists an
incomparably larger number of both potential unwitting infringers of program patents and potential innovators, whose
efforts might be chilled by either the possibility of infringement actions or the transaction cost of patent searches.
(2) Past judicial doctrines limiting the scope of patent coverage
have been formulated with the help of further limitations
posed by materials costs on both future innovation in related
areas and in the exploitation of the invention at hand. Other
types of inventions are typically "congealed" at the exploitation stage in tangible, relatively expensive and permanent
form, either as actual machines or as installed equipment
peculiarly suited to the implementation of processes. Scopelimiting doctrines could therefore be formulated with the
thought that later innovative use of the concepts subject to
earlier patent could be distinguished by the courts on the
basis of easily recognized physical differences, when such
distinctions seemed otherwise appropriate. Claims covering
programs do not offer this opportunity unless they are
confined to particular applications which entail such physical embodiment.
(3) The nonobviousness requirements of section 103 are designed to ensure that patents control only technology which does
not presently exist and which is not readily available. Application of the test relies upon some minimally acceptable
method of putting appropriate prior art before the court.
When the population of such art is relatively small, or where
the relevant subset can be easily identified, the Patent Office
and defendants to infringement actions are adequately reli-
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able protectors of the broader public interest. But the candidates for prior art in many areas of program innovation are
both numerous and uncollected. Moreover, although application of the nonobviousness test is necessarily an arbitrary
judicial exercise at some point, the substantial and permanent physical embodiment of most preprogram innovations
has probably assisted the courts in at least two ways. First,
numerous complexities have been reduced to visible and
more easily comprehensible physical forms. Second, novel
physical structures suggest significant empirical experimentation with the properties of incorporated materials and
components, and those empirical requirements imply something nondeterminative about such inventions. Many program innovations do not exhibit these characteristics. The
most visually comprehensible embodiment may consist of
an extremely complex flowchart, and the only experimentation required may consist of the detection and correction of
mistakes in logic.

Further differences between program-related inventions and other
technologies derive from the sheer number and variety of computer
applications. These increase the potential benefits from software innovations, but also expand the scope of potentially unfavorable patent
effects.
The variety of program-related inventions revealed in the cases
discussed suggests that it may be appropriate to classify these inventions and accord each class different legal treatment. Claims drawn
explicitly to physical processes of which digital computation constitutes only one step may raise policy questions that differ from those
generated by less confined claims. Inventions which can be practiced
without digital computation may differ from those without alternative
utility. Among the latter, important distinctions might be made between those confined to computer implementation by heavy volumes of
computation and those without even theoretical interest except in computer application.
In the past, the potentially novel policy implications of computer
programming have been largely confined to software, a major reason
why the long-repeated "engineering equivalence" of hardware and
software has not been a particularly persuasive argument for legal
equivalence. Technological developments promise to narrow the legally
relevant differences,5 55 however, and the courts may be confronted with
a choice between reviewing the blanket subject matter approval of
permanent hardware configurations or being left with totally artificial
distinctions between the treatment of hardware and software.
555. A pertinent example is the development of "programmable read-only memory" technology, which permits the automatic and relatively inexpensive embodiment of modest-sized software routines in permanent semiconductor (hardware)
form.
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In sum, once the existence of the general patent system is assumed,
the relevant agenda would seem to consist of (1) identifying the legally
significant ways in which computer programs differ from other technologies; (2) classifying the various forms of program-related inventions; (3) establishing whether each form is accompanied by such substantial policy-relevant differences that special treatment is warranted;
and (4) formulating appropriate legal doctrines to deal with these differences. If the debate and litigation continue on the basis of denying,
on the one hand, the relevance of policy considerations, and asserting,
on the other hand, conclusionary economic arguments going to the
entire patent system, coupled with wild characterizations, it will be
purely accidental if the ultimate outcome is socially desirable.
B. Appropriate Forum for the ProgramPatentDecision
Congress would seem to be the appropriate forum for permanent
resolution of the program patent question. It can call upon the resources needed for a sustained and integrated examination of the issues. It is not confined to piecemeal considerations of issues raised by
particular cases, but can take into account the inter-related effects of
sections 101, 103 and 112, as well as the various principles that apply
during infringement litigation. Not only is Congress not burdened with
old case law, but also it can terminate its effect where appropriate. In
those cases where special forms of protection may be more suitable than
the regular patent system, they can be devised in the context of a review
of closely related, but distinguishable, subject matter. Finally, carefully
drafted statutory changes could bring a uniformity of treatment that
would emerge from the courts, if at all, only after a prolonged course of
litigation and appeal. A major danger in the judicial forum is that the
courts, confronted with extremely complex legal and economic issues
not properly illuminated by the parties, may resort to inadequately
556
considered and sweeping statements of law for the sake of repose.
556. In opposing the rehearing of the PraterI case, Judge Rich said:
Some have approached this case as though we were obliged to decide a
momentous question of public policy: should computer programs be patentable? That is the problem the Patent Office presented to Congress,
But we are not at all concerned with what
where the question belongs ....
ought to be. We are not a policy-making body but a court of law. The simple
question which has been before us is whether appellants' claimed process
and apparatus are patentable under the existing statutes.
415 F.2d at 1393, 160 U.S.P.Q. at 233,2 CLSR at 31 (Rich, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original). It is a fundamental contention of this article that program-related patents
present an extremely difficult problem of applying extant policy, a task with
which the courts are charged. Moreover, the section 101 inquiry is not terminated
when it is established that the subject matter is a machine or an automatic
machine process. In reaching its outcome in Benson, regardless of how narrowly
the holding is construed, the Supreme Court necessarily held that much.
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The objections raised to a legislative resolution of the question have
been largely unconvincing. It is true that Congress can be slow to act,
but life in the courts will surely go on much as before in the interim.
Lobbyists will indeed appear to urge their special interests, but to the
extent that lobbying is undesirable, it is because it implies a special
access to the decision-making process by parties who do not necessarily
represent the general, public interest.
How representative of the public interest have the parties to program patent litigation been? The only party charged with defending the
public interest has been the Patent Office, which as an institutional
litigant has had many things to think about in addition to the cases
already discussed. And, in general, both the patent bar and the
commercial amici curiae have vested interests in certain aspects of the
patent system that must be scrutinized before deciding this issue.
The most compelling reason for deferring to congressional action
on the program-related patent question is that the general patent system may be subjected to revision in the near future. Under these circumstances, legislation on a particular patent question would be premature, since changes in the general law could also alter the complexion of issues peculiar to program-related patents.
In this connection, an additional observation is appropriate. Shortly after the decision in Benson, the following statement regarding
program patent legislation was attributed to an aide to Senator John
McClellan, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Patents,
Trademarks and Copyrights: "We probably need some type of special
conference to decide what to do. Not a public hearing, but a conference
We held a similar conference in the copyright
with interested parties.
55 7
area that went well.
In fact, the "interested parties" have been speaking for a decade
and a half without substantial progress toward an appropriate resolution of the issue. If Congress perceives that the policy stakes are significant, it should actively engage in analysis of the issues by the academic,
legal and computer communities, as well as the economics profession.
In conclusion, it appears that the question of program-related patents will be left to the judiciary for the time being. It is therefore hoped
that the courts will become more responsive to, as well as demanding,
well-reasoned and empirically supported argumentation directed to the
policies which already underlie the patent system.
557. Quoted in Titus, Supreme Court Ruling Fails to Settle Issue of Patenting
Computer Programs, 16 COM. ACM 63 (1973).

